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SUBTRACTION BY ADDITION?: THE THIRTEENTH AND 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS 
Mark A. Graber* 
The celebration of the Thirteenth Amendment in many Essays pre-
pared for this Symposium may be premature. That the Thirteenth 
Amendment arguably protects a different and, perhaps, wider array of 
rights than the Fourteenth Amendment may be less important than the 
less controversial claim that the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified af-
ter the Thirteenth Amendment. If the Fourteenth Amendment covers sim-
ilar ground as the Thirteenth Amendment, but protects a narrower set of 
rights than the Thirteenth Amendment, then the proper inference may be 
that the Fourteenth Amendment repealed or modified crucial rights orig-
inally protected by the Thirteenth Amendment. The broad interpretation 
of the Thirteenth Amendment, which is increasingly in vogue in certain 
progressive circles, may have been good constitutional law only between 
1865 and 1868. For purposes of argument, this Essay assumes that the 
participants in this Symposium correctly interpret the original Thirteenth 
Amendment when they construe the constitutional ban on slavery 
broadly in order to protect a wide variety of fundamental rights. Rather 
than interpret the Fourteenth Amendment as adding to the Thirteenth, 
however, this Essay explores the textual and political evidence support-
ing claims that the Fourteenth Amendment diminished the rights pro-
tected by the Thirteenth Amendment or, more accurately, diminished the 
likelihood that any of the post-Civil War Amendments would be inter-
preted as protecting rights that might have been protected by a freestand-
ing Thirteenth Amendment. Thirteen plus one, in this case, may be less 
than thirteen. 
INTRODUCTION 
Thaddeus Stevens complained bitterly about the final wording of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. He informed the House of Representatives that 
his vote to send the revised text to the states for ratification was reluctant. 
Stevens said,  
In my youth, in my manhood, in my old age, I had fondly 
dreamed that . . . no distinction would be tolerated in this puri-
fied Republic but what arose from merit and conduct. This 
bright dream has vanished “like the baseless fabric of a vision.” I 
find that we shall be obliged to be content with patching up the 
worst portions of the ancient edifice, and leaving it, in many of 
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its parts, to be swept through by the tempests, the frosts, and the 
storms of despotism. 
Do you inquire why, holding these views and possessing 
some will of my own, I accept so imperfect a proposition? I an-
swer, because I live among men and not among angels; among 
men as intelligent, as determined, and as independent as my-
self, who, not agreeing with me, do not choose to yield their 
opinions to mine. Mutual concession, therefore, is our only re-
sort, or mutual hostilities.1 
Many Radical Republicans shared Stevens’s disappointment. The fi-
nal text of the Fourteenth Amendment, in their opinion, substantially 
watered down vital constitutional protections for former slaves and other 
Americans. Wendell Phillips, a leading abolitionist, declared crucial pro-
visions to be a “fatal and total surrender.”2 Senator James Grimes con-
ceded, “It is not exactly what any of us wanted; but we were each com-
pelled to surrender some of our individual preferences in order to se-
cure anything . . . .”3 Michael Les Benedict captured this understanding 
when he entitled his seminal study of the politics that took place when 
the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted, A Compromise of Principle.4  
Important recent works on the Thirteenth Amendment have more 
uplifting titles. Michael Vorenberg’s study is entitled Final Freedom.5 In 
2004, Alexander Tsesis penned The Thirteenth Amendment and American 
Freedom: A Legal History.6 Six years later, Tsesis published The Promises of 
Liberty: The History and Contemporary Relevance of the Thirteenth Amendment.7 
Other titles include Lincoln and Freedom: Slavery, Emancipation, and the 
Thirteenth Amendment8 and The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the 
Thirteenth Amendment.9 
                                                 
1. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3148 (1866) (statement of Rep. Thaddeus 
Stevens). 
2. Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution 1863–1877, at 255 
(1988). 
3. Letter from James Grimes to Mrs. Grimes (Apr. 30, 1866), in William Salter, The 
Life of James W. Grimes: Governor of Iowa, 1854–1858; A Senator of the United States, 
1859–1869, at 292, 292 (1876). 
4. Michael Les Benedict, A Compromise of Principle: Congressional Republicans and 
Reconstruction 1863–1869, at 14 (1974) (noting “[R]adical Republicans knew that their 
conservative allies were not as committed as they to the racially egalitarian principles of 
the Republican party, and they were continually frustrated in their attempts to win what 
they conceived to be true security for the Union”).  
5. Michael Vorenberg, Final Freedom: The Civil War, the Abolition of Slavery, and 
the Thirteenth Amendment (2001). 
6. Alexander Tsesis, The Thirteenth Amendment and American Freedom: A Legal 
History (2004) [hereinafter Tsesis, Legal History]. 
7. The Promises of Liberty: The History and Contemporary Relevance of the 
Thirteenth Amendment (Alexander Tsesis ed., 2010).  
8. Lincoln and Freedom: Slavery, Emancipation, and the Thirteenth Amendment 1, 
5 (Harold Holzer & Sara Vaughn Gabbard eds., 2007) (collecting essays to “illuminate the 
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The celebratory titles of contemporary books on the Thirteenth 
Amendment match the celebratory rhetoric of antislavery advocates 
when the Thirteenth Amendment was framed and ratified. No 
Republican took to the floor to complain bitterly about compromises of 
principle when the Thirteenth Amendment was approved by the House 
and Senate. Martin Thayer spoke for his fellow antislavery advocates 
when he asserted, “We have wiped away the black spot from our bright 
shield and surely God will bless us for it.”10 This is not to say that the final 
text of the Thirteenth Amendment was entirely consistent with Radical 
Republican preferences. Charles Sumner had previously proposed a con-
stitutional amendment that stated, “Everywhere within the limits of the 
United States, and of each State or Territory thereof, all persons are 
equal before the law, so that no person can hold another as a slave.”11 
Still, Republicans in 1865 were far happier with the final text of the 
Thirteenth Amendment than more radical Republicans in 1868 were 
with the final text of the Fourteenth Amendment. Consider Vorenberg’s 
description of the reaction when Congress passed the Thirteenth 
Amendment on to the states: 
For a moment there was only a disbelieving, hollow silence. 
Then the House exploded in cheers. Members threw their hats 
to the roof, caught them, and smashed them against their 
desks. . . . Blacks in the audience were equally moved, not only 
by the meaning of the event but by the reaction of the whites 
around them. . . .  
For most Republican congressmen, it was the crowning 
moment of their careers.12 
William Lloyd Garrison proclaimed that a Constitution he previously re-
garded as “‘a covenant with death’” had been replaced by “‘a covenant 
with life.’”13 
This Symposium vindicates the Republican celebration of the 
Thirteenth Amendment. Such worthy descendants of Charles Sumner as 
Jack Balkin, William Carter, Jr., Andrew Koppelman, Sanford Levinson, 
Darrell Miller, Aviam Soifer, Alexander Tsesis, and Rebecca Zietlow have 
written exceptional Essays, which employ the Thirteenth Amendment to 
advance or support numerous progressive causes, from abortion rights to 
laws protecting employees who object to hate speech in their work-
                                                                                                                 
manner in which America’s greatest president dealt with the greatest challenge of his—
and our nation’s—time”). 
9. G. Sidney Buchanan et al., The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, 13 Hous. L. Rev. 63 (1975). 
10. Vorenberg, supra note 5, at 208.  
11. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 521 (1864) (statement of Sen. Charles 
Sumner). 
12. Vorenberg, supra note 5, at 207–08. 
13. Vorenberg, supra note 5, at 208 (quoting The Liberator, Feb. 10, 1865, at 2).  
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place.14 The participants in a recent symposium at the University of 
Maryland reached similar conclusions about the potential progressive 
power of the constitutional ban on slavery.15 Commentators suggested 
that the Thirteenth Amendment could be used for such diverse purposes 
as striking down bans on same-sex marriage and ending oppressive labor 
practices.16 This cheering is bipartisan. Conservatives are also finding the 
Thirteenth Amendment a source of cherished rights.17 Some maintain 
                                                 
14. See generally Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Dangerous Thirteenth 
Amendment, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1459 (2012) (arguing Amendment can be applied 
outside of chattel slavery); William M. Carter Jr., The Thirteenth Amendment and Pro-
Equality Speech, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1855 (2012) (arguing Amendment empowered 
Congress to prohibit retaliation against pro-equality speech); Andrew Koppelman, 
Originalism, Abortion, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1917 (2012) 
(arguing Amendment supports abortion rights); Darrell A.H. Miller, The Thirteenth 
Amendment and the Regulation of Custom, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1811 (2012) (arguing 
Amendment empowered Congress to identify and prohibit customs related to slavery); 
Aviam Soifer, Federal Protection, Paternalism, and the Virtually Forgotten Prohibition of 
Voluntary Peonage, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1607 (2012) (arguing Thirty-Ninth Congress 
asserted authority to ban voluntary peonage); Alexander Tsesis, Gender Subordination 
and the Thirteenth Amendment, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1641 (2012) [hereinafter Tsesis, 
Gender Subordination] (arguing Amendment can be used against gender 
discrimination); Rebecca E. Zietlow, James Ashley’s Thirteenth Amendment, 112 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1697 (2012) (discussing Amendment’s potential for securing rights of belonging 
which encompass race, class, and gender). This is not to demean the other fine papers in 
this Symposium but merely to highlight those that interpret the Thirteenth Amendment 
broadly. 
15. See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, Involuntary Servitude, Public Accommodations Laws, 
and the Legacy of Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 71 Md. L. Rev. 83, 129 (2011) 
(arguing Thirteenth Amendment has broad aim of equal civil liberties); James Gray Pope, 
What’s Different About the Thirteenth Amendment, and Why Does It Matter?, 71 Md. L. 
Rev. 189, 189–90 (2011) (discussing four unique features of Thirteenth Amendment that 
give rise to its broad interpretation); Alexander Tsesis, Congressional Authority to 
Interpret the Thirteenth Amendment, 71 Md. L. Rev. 40, 53–56 (2011) (arguing 
Thirteenth Amendment was intended by framers to have broad enforcement power). My 
essay in the Maryland Symposium alluded to the possibility that the Fourteenth 
Amendment might have narrowed the rights protected by the Thirteenth Amendment, 
but left that claim entirely undeveloped. See generally Mark A. Graber, Foreword: Plus or 
Minus One: The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, 71 Md. L. Rev. 12 (2011). 
16. See Julie Novkov, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Meaning of Familial 
Bonds, 71 Md. L. Rev. 203, 226 (2011) (arguing “the denial of recognition for the marital 
and familial relationship is a contemporary badge of servitude or at least of deep inferior-
ity”); Pope, supra note 15, at 193 (arguing “the Thirteenth Amendment affirmatively 
commands both Congress and the courts to ascertain what rights are necessary to 
ensure . . . the ongoing operation of a free labor system”). 
17. See Ken I. Kersch, Beyond Originalism: Conservative Declarationism and 
Constitutional Redemption, 71 Md. L. Rev. 229, 229–30 (2011) (noting that many influen-
tial modern conservative theorists “recount the nation’s experience with slavery 
through . . . ‘Declarationism’ . . . [a] view that the Constitution can only be understood 
and interpreted in light of the principles enunciated in the opening words of the 
Declaration of Independence”). 
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that the individual mandate in the Affordable Health Care Act is analo-
gous to the human bondage Americans outlawed in 1865.18 
This renewed emphasis on the Thirteenth Amendment is inspired, 
in part, by a sense that the Fourteenth Amendment may be a weaker reed 
for protecting fundamental rights. The Slaughter-House Cases neutered the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause in Section 1.19 A series of judicial prece-
dents over the past forty years has limited judicial capacity to remedy 
what many progressives believe are severe violations of the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. and sub-
sequent cases impose a strict state action requirement on equal protec-
tion and due process claims.20 Washington v. Davis and subsequent cases 
impose a nearly impossible burden of proof on plaintiffs alleging race 
discrimination where there is no “smoking gun.”21 The text of the 
Fourteenth Amendment augments these difficulties. The words “No 
State shall” in the Fourteenth Amendment provide the textual founda-
tions for the state action requirement,22 even if one believes Jackson inter-
preted that requirement too strictly.23 Section 2 of the Fourteenth 
                                                 
18. See Complaint at 3–4, Indep. Am. Party v. Obama, No. 2:10-cv-01477 (D. Nev. 
Aug. 31, 2010) (asserting Affordable Care Act violated eight different amendments, in-
cluding Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of “involuntary servitude”).  
19. See 83 U.S. 36, 76–78 (1873) (confining language to “those privileges and 
immunities which are fundamental” and denying provision created rights). 
20. 419 U.S. 345, 358–59 (1974) (concluding state not sufficiently connected to pub-
lic utility actions for purposes of making conduct state action under Fourteenth 
Amendment); accord DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194 
(1989) (rejecting argument that “failure of a state or local government entity or its agents 
to provide an individual with adequate protection services constitutes a violation” of 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1012 (1982) 
(concluding nursing homes’ decisions regarding Medicaid patients did not constitute state 
action); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 843 (1982) (holding private school is not 
state actor under Fourteenth Amendment). 
21. 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (rejecting disparate impact standard for equal protec-
tion claims under Fourteenth Amendment); accord McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 
(1987) (explaining “to prevail under the Equal Protection Clause [plaintiff] must prove 
the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose” in imposing capital pun-
ishment); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 
(1977) (holding respondents “failed to carry their burden of proving that discriminatory 
purpose was a motivating factor” in zoning decision).  
22. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 
922, 936 (1982) (“This Court . . . [has] affirmed the essential dichotomy set forth in [the 
Fourteenth] Amendment between deprivation by the State, subject to scrutiny under its 
provisions, and private conduct, ‘however discriminatory or wrongful,’ against which the 
Fourteenth Amendment offers no shield.” (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 349)); Ex parte 
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346–47 (1879) (noting that “the prohibitions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment are addressed to the States” and discussing what constitutes state action un-
der Amendment).  
23. See Kellen Mcclendon, Do Hospitals in Pennsylvania Relieve the Government of 
Some of Its Burden?, 67 Temp. L. Rev. 517, 556 (1994) (arguing Supreme Court’s 
decision in Jackson severely limited potential ground for finding state action in future 
cases). 
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Amendment provides plausible grounds for thinking that political rights 
are not protected by Section 1.24 Conservatives can point to numerous 
statements made on the floor of Reconstruction Congress suggesting 
sharp limitations on the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, most no-
tably the speech by Thaddeus Stevens quoted in the first paragraph of 
this Essay. Significantly, while in 1866 the narrowest constructions of the 
Thirteenth Amendment were typically made by Democrats uninterested 
in any form of racial equality,25 many of the most bitter complaints about 
the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866 were made by radical 
Reconstructionists who proposed more capacious amendments.26 One 
consequence of the different reception the first two post-Civil War 
Amendments received among Radicals is that the same antislavery advo-
cates who can be quoted in support of the broadest interpretation of the 
Thirteenth Amendment are often the leading authorities for the narrow-
est interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.27 
This celebration of the Thirteenth Amendment may nevertheless be 
premature. That the Thirteenth Amendment arguably protects a differ-
ent and, perhaps, wider array of rights than the Fourteenth Amendment 
may be less important than the less controversial claim that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified after the Thirteenth Amendment. 
In constitutional law, first in time is last in line. If there is a conflict be-
tween two constitutional provisions, the later provision governs.28 If, 
therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment covers similar ground as the 
Thirteenth Amendment, but protects a narrower set of rights than the 
Thirteenth Amendment, then the proper inference may be that the 
Fourteenth Amendment repealed or modified crucial rights originally 
protected by the Thirteenth Amendment. The broad interpretation of 
the Thirteenth Amendment, which is increasingly in vogue in certain 
progressive circles, may have been good constitutional law only between 
1865 and 1868. 
This Essay explores the relationship between the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. For purposes of argument, this Essay assumes 
that the participants in this Symposium correctly interpret the original 
Thirteenth Amendment when they construe the constitutional ban on 
                                                 
24. See infra notes 118–127 and accompanying text (discussing historical concep-
tions of link between freedom from bondage and political rights). 
25. See, e.g., The Reconstruction Amendments’ Debates 107 (Alfred Avins ed., 1967) 
(speech of Sen. Thomas Hendricks). 
26. See, e.g., Xi Wang, Black Suffrage and the Redefinition of American Freedom, 
1860–1870, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 2153, 2195 (1996) (quoting Radical Republican James 
Ashley saying final version was “the best I could get”). 
27. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment 204 (1997) (citing Thaddeus Stevens’s refutation of broad con-
struction of Equal Protection Clause). 
28. 16 American Jurisprudence, Constitutional Law § 67 (2d ed. 2009) (explaining 
that later provision governs because “it is the latest expression of the will of the people”).  
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slavery broadly in order to protect a wide variety of fundamental rights. 
The question in this Essay is whether all of those fundamental rights pro-
tected by the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865 survived the ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. Rather than interpret the 
Fourteenth Amendment as adding to the Thirteenth, as is the common 
practice, or treat the post-Civil War Amendments as a coherent whole, 
this Essay explores the textual and political evidence supporting claims 
that the Fourteenth Amendment diminished the rights protected by the 
Thirteenth Amendment or, more accurately, diminished the likelihood 
that any of the post-Civil War Amendments would be interpreted as pro-
tecting rights that might have been protected by a freestanding 
Thirteenth Amendment. Thirteen plus one, in this case, may be less than 
thirteen. 
Part I of the Essay makes the very unsurprising case for the proposi-
tion that the Fourteenth Amendment did not weaken or repeal any right 
protected by the Thirteenth Amendment. Both the Slaughter-House Cases 
and the constitutional text point to an ever-expanding series of constitu-
tional rights.29 Republicans during Reconstruction complained about the 
limited scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, but no antislavery advocate 
objected that Section 1 modified the constitutional ban on slavery.30 The 
Fourteenth Amendment did arguably modify other constitutional rights, 
most notably certain antebellum constitutional rights of slaveholders 
(and possibly even a constitutional right to vote).31 For this reason, 
Americans are wrong to insist that constitutional amendments never or 
never should modify or repeal existing constitutional rights.32 Neverthe-
less, Part I’s “lesson in the obvious” suggests that only an academic des-
perate to write a paper for a prestigious symposium might propose that 
the Fourteenth Amendment repealed the Thirteenth Amendment. 
Part II, admittedly written by an academic desperate to write a paper 
for a prestigious symposium, discusses those elements of precedent, text, 
and history that support claims that the Fourteenth Amendment elimi-
nated or weakened the foundations for rights originally protected by the 
Thirteenth Amendment. The conventional story of an ever-expanding 
series of constitutional rights relies heavily on the very narrow interpreta-
tion of the Thirteenth Amendment articulated in the Slaughter-House 
                                                 
29. See infra notes 49–57 and accompanying text.  
30. See infra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.  
31. See infra notes 68–81 and accompanying text.  
32. See, e.g., Hadley Arkes, Beyond the Constitution 80 (1990) (explaining “no man 
of prudence would urge us to repeal the Bill of Rights”). See generally Kathleen Sullivan, 
What’s Wrong with Constitutional Amendments?, in New Federalist Papers: Essays in 
Defense of the Constitution 61, 61–67 (Alan Brinkley, Nelson W. Polsby & Kathleen M. 
Sullivan eds., 1997) (arguing “unless the ordinary give-and-take of our politics proves in-
capable of solving something, the Constitution is not the place to fix it” and thus amend-
ing Constitution is and should be rare). 
1508 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 112:1501 
 
Cases.33 If, however, the Thirteenth Amendment was originally under-
stood as protecting the broad array of rights suggested by other papers 
for this Symposium,34 then the real possibility exists that the ratification 
of the Fourteenth Amendment was part of the process by which the ro-
bust conception of freedom promised by the constitutional ban on in-
voluntary servitude was transformed by the Supreme Court in the late 
nineteenth century into a much weaker guarantee of formal legal equal-
ity.35 The text of the Thirteenth Amendment standing alone may protect 
more rights than the combination of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Constitutional framers are not paid by the word. On the 
plausible assumption that constitutional amendments do not merely reit-
erate preexisting rights and powers, the best reading of the first two post-
Civil War Amendments may be that the Thirteenth Amendment is lim-
ited to emancipation while the Fourteenth Amendment elaborates the 
rights of newly freed slaves and others who might be similarly situated. 
This became the dominant interpretive theory in both Congress and the 
Supreme Court after 1868.36 Republicans who in 1866 asserted that the 
Thirteenth Amendment guaranteed a robust set of freedoms relied al-
most exclusively on the Fourteenth Amendment when making similar 
rights claims in 1875.37 At the very least, the Fourteenth Amendment 
seems to have clarified the rights protected by the Thirteenth 
Amendment. During that clarification process, some rights claims be-
came easier to make, but many constitutional rights claims favored by 
Thirteenth Amendment revivalists became more difficult to assert. 
Part III considers why and whether Thirteenth Amendment revival-
ists should consider this revisionist and pessimistic history. Part III argues 
they must do so because we cannot rediscover the progressive Thirteenth 
Amendment unless we understand why the robust understanding of con-
stitutional freedom was lost. That robust understanding was lost because 
Americans after early 1866 increasingly lost the political will to imple-
                                                 
33. See infra notes 87–96 and accompanying text.  
34. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 14, at 1857 (arguing Amendment should be used to 
protect right to pro-equality speech because framers “well understood the dangers faced 
by the allies of racial justice and the importance of protecting them if the project of free-
dom were to succeed”); Koppelman, supra note 14, at 1937–42 (mounting originalist 
argument that Amendment created right to abortion in light of contemporary awareness 
of forcible impregnation of slave women).  
35. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542, 550–51 (1896) (holding law 
providing for separate railway cars based on race did not violate Thirteenth or Fourteenth 
Amendment); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (noting Thirteenth Amendment 
“merely abolishes slavery”); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1875) (stating 
Fourteenth Amendment “adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another”). 
36. See infra notes 172–184 and accompanying text (describing congressional state-
ments and federal court opinions relying only on Congress’s power under Fourteenth 
Amendment to pass civil rights legislation).  
37. See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 381–84 (1872) (statement of Sen. Charles 
Sumner) (discussing proposal on what later became Civil Rights Act of 1875).  
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ment a progressive antislavery constitutional vision.38 The ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment played a major role in the process that 
shrank the Thirteenth Amendment. The contemporary lessons to be 
learned are as much about constitutional politics as constitutional law. 
This Essay challenges two conventional narratives of the post-Civil 
War Amendments. Justice Miller’s opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases 
spun both stories.39 His majority opinion told the tale of ever-increasing 
freedoms. The Thirteenth Amendment added to previous constitutional 
protections.40 The Fourteenth Amendment protected rights not pro-
tected by the Thirteenth Amendment.41 The Fifteenth Amendment pro-
tected rights not protected by either the Thirteenth or the Fourteenth 
Amendment.42 Slaughter-House also proclaimed that all three constitu-
tional amendments had “a unity of purpose.”43 This is the second conven-
tional narrative. Bruce Ackerman’s study of major constitutional trans-
formations in American history expands on this second description of 
the post-Civil War Constitution.44 Ackerman speaks of the epic triumph 
of a grand constitutional vision: Republicans gain control of the national 
government. They ratify the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments, all three of which are united by common commitment to 
“nationalize[] the protection of individual rights against state abridge-
ment.”45 This Essay offers a third view. A Republican Party whose commit-
ment to racial equality was beginning to weaken passed a Fourteenth 
Amendment that both clarified and modified the rights protected by the 
Thirteenth Amendment.46 When doing so, Republicans provided firmer 
foundations for a more robust set of freedoms than offered by the reign-
ing Democratic Party account of the constitutional ban on slavery, while 
                                                 
38. See infra notes 215–226 and accompanying text (tracing decline in political will 
to achieve racial equality after ratification of Thirteenth Amendment).  
39. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); see also infra notes 49–59 and accompanying text 
(exploring Justice Miller’s opinion).  
40. See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 68–69 (discussing Thirteenth Amendment).  
41. See id. at 70 (explaining Fourteenth Amendment was passed because framers 
thought “more was necessary in the way of constitutional protection to the unfortunate 
race who had suffered so much”).  
42. See id. at 71 (explaining Fifteenth Amendment gave former slaves, whom “the 
fourteenth amendment [had] . . . declared to be . . . citizen[s] of the United States” right 
to vote).  
43. Id. at 67.  
44. Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (1991). 
45. Id. at 82.  
46. See infra notes 219–222 and accompanying text (discussing Republican Party’s 
weakening commitment to civil rights during period that Fourteenth Amendment was 
passed).  
1510 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 112:1501 
 
weakening the constitutional foundations for more radical Republican 
interpretations of the Thirteenth Amendment.47  
The following pages are better designed to raise different questions 
about why the Thirteenth Amendment has failed to meet progressive 
aspirations than to refute broad progressive claims about the original 
meaning of the text. The Thirteenth Amendment had great promise in 
1865.48 That promise has not been realized for nearly 150 years. In a sym-
posium devoted to the Thirteenth Amendment, we might spend some 
time thinking about why the Thirteenth Amendment has not achieved 
that promise, as well as revitalizing what that promise might mean. 
Thinking about whether the Fourteenth Amendment modified that 
promise might not only help us with some of the relevant constitutional 
law but, more importantly, some of the constitutional politics that have 
heretofore limited the progressive potential of the Thirteenth 
Amendment. 
I. A LESSON IN THE OBVIOUS: THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT PLUS ONE 
The Slaughter-House Cases, the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and the history of the post-Civil War Amendments provide strong 
grounds for thinking that the persons who drafted and framed the 
Fourteenth Amendment augmented or at least confirmed the constitu-
tional rights protected by the Thirteenth Amendment. Slaughter-House 
speaks of the post-Civil War Amendments as having “a unity of pur-
pose.”49 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment details the rights of 
“[a]ll persons born in the United States,” including former slaves.50 
Sections 2, 3, and 4, by comparison, withhold rights from former slave-
owners and states that discriminate against persons of color.51 No propo-
nent of the Fourteenth Amendment asserted that any provision in that 
text was intended to limit the Thirteenth Amendment.  
A. Slaughter-House 
Justice Miller’s opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases is the canonical 
statement of the conventional understanding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment augmented the constitutional ban on slavery. Miller told a 
Whig history of American freedom. The Thirteenth Amendment abol-
                                                 
47. See infra notes 175–182 and accompanying text (noting Republicans focused on 
Fourteenth Amendment at expense of Thirteenth Amendment when considering Civil 
Rights Act of 1875).  
48. See infra notes 97–100 and accompanying text (quoting statements from congres-
sional debates that Thirteenth Amendment broadly protects rights).  
49. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67 (1872).  
50. U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1.  
51. See id. amend. XIV, §§ 2–4 (reducing political representation and constraining 
borrowing authority of former slaveowning states).  
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ished slavery.52 Each subsequent amendment was ratified for the purpose 
of plugging up holes that history had revealed in the rights protected by 
previous amendments.53 Americans from 1865 to 1870, Miller concluded, 
enjoyed an ever-expanding set of constitutional rights. 
Miller’s history of the Civil War Amendments began, appropriately, 
with the Thirteenth Amendment. The purpose of that Amendment, he 
maintained, was to entrench the result of the Civil War and 
Emancipation Proclamation. Miller stated that “those who had succeeded 
in re-establishing the authority of the Federal government were not con-
tent to permit this great act of emancipation to rest on” the outcome of 
the war and the Emancipation Proclamation alone.54 Instead they were 
“determined to place [the] main and most valuable result [of the war] in 
the Constitution of the restored Union as one of its fundamental arti-
cles.”55 
Time quickly revealed that the constitutional ban on slavery did not 
adequately protect the fundamental rights of newly freed slaves. The 
Black Codes in the South demonstrated that, “notwithstanding the for-
mal recognition by those States of the abolition of slavery, the condition 
of the slave race would, without further protection of the Federal gov-
ernment, be almost as bad as it was before.”56 The Fourteenth 
Amendment was designed to remedy those identified weaknesses in the 
rights protected by the Thirteenth Amendment. “Circumstances” in the 
South, Miller asserted,  
forced upon the statesmen who had conducted the Federal 
government in safety through the crisis of the rebellion, and 
who supposed that by the thirteenth article of amendment they 
had secured the result of their labors, the conviction that some-
thing more was necessary in the way of constitutional protection 
to the unfortunate race who had suffered so much.57 
Time then quickly revealed flaws in the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
constitutional scheme for protecting the rights of newly freed slaves. 
Miller’s Slaughter-House opinion continued,  
A few years' experience satisfied the thoughtful men who had 
been the authors of the other two amendments that, notwith-
standing the restraints of those articles on the States, and the 
laws passed under the additional powers granted to Congress, 
these were inadequate for the protection of life, liberty, and 
property, without which freedom to the slave was no boon.58 
                                                 
52. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 69–70 (analyzing text of Thirteenth Amendment).  
53. Id. at 80 (explaining Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments added 
to privileges and immunities of United States citizens).  
54. Id. at 68.  
55. Id.  
56. Id. at 70. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 71.  
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These failings resulted in the Fifteenth Amendment, which Miller inac-
curately stated made African Americans “voter[s] in every State of the 
Union.”59 
Republican speeches during the framing and ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment buttress Justice Miller’s history of the post-Civil 
War Constitution. Radicals complained that Congress had not provided 
sufficient additional constitutional protections to newly freed slaves.60 In 
the speech quoted in the first paragraph of this Essay, Thaddeus Stevens 
accused his fellow representatives of merely “patching up the worst por-
tions of the ancient edifice.”61 No Republican maintained that Congress 
in 1868 tore down protections constructed in 1865. 
B. The Constitutional Text 
The constitutional text further supports Miller’s vision of an ever-
expanding series of constitutional rights. Americans know how to write 
an amendment that repeals or modifies existing constitutional rights. 
The Twenty-First Amendment states that “[t]he eighteenth article of 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby re-
pealed.”62 No analogous language repealing or modifying the Thirteenth 
Amendment appears in either the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment.  
But looks can be deceiving. The Thirteenth Amendment also does 
not explicitly repeal any previous constitutional amendment. 
Nevertheless, Section 1 plainly abolished previously existing constitu-
tional rights. The constitutional ban on slavery repealed the Fugitive 
Slave Clause in Article IV, Section 2. If Dred Scott v. Sandford correctly 
held that the Fifth Amendment protected the constitutional right of 
slaveholders to bring slaves into American territories,63 then the 
Thirteenth Amendment altered the scope of the Due Process Clause. At 
the very least, the Thirteenth Amendment ended an extremely important 
strain in American constitutionalism that understood the Constitution as 
                                                 
59. Id. The Fifteenth Amendment forbids the federal government and the states 
from discriminating on the ground of race when allocating voting rights. U.S. Const. 
amend. XV. No person is given the constitutional right to cast a ballot. 
60. See Horace Edgar Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 58–59 
(1908) (observing Congressman John Bingham supported Fourteenth Amendment in 
order to empower Congress to enforce Bill of Rights against states); Kristian D. Whitten, 
The Fourteenth Amendment: Justice Bradley’s Twentieth Century Legacy, 29 Cumb. L. 
Rev. 143, 156 (1999) (arguing Congress intended to bind states to Bill of Rights through 
Fourteenth Amendment so as to secure additional rights for former slaves). 
61. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3148 (1866) (statement of Sen. Thaddeus 
Stevens). 
62. U.S. Const. amend. XXI, § 1. 
63. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856); see Mark A. Graber, Dred Scott and the Problem of 
Constitutional Evil 58 (2006) (arguing “[o]nce one concedes, as antebellum Republicans 
did, that the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution protected the right to bring personal 
property into the territories, the historical case for Dred Scott becomes quite persuasive”). 
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providing substantial protections for rights to human property.64 The 
constitutional declaration of rights in Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment nevertheless seems perfectly consistent with the declaration 
in the Thirteenth Amendment that slavery or involuntary servitude shall 
not exist in the United States or, for that matter, any prominent interpre-
tation of the Thirteenth Amendment that broadly interprets the constitu-
tional ban on human bondage. A fine analysis might provide grounds for 
thinking that the Republican effort to increase the constitutional rights 
of newly freed slaves diminished some constitutional rights previously 
enjoyed by other Americans. The constitutional right of birthright citi-
zenship, for example, arguably abolished the putative right American 
citizens may have enjoyed before the Civil War to choose members of 
their polity.65 The more important point is that nothing in the language 
of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment supports claims that 
Republicans in 1868 sought to diminish whatever rights were granted to 
newly freed slaves in 1865. 
The structure of the Fourteenth Amendment provides additional 
foundation for the claim that the persons responsible for that provision 
did not repeal any right granted when the Thirteenth Amendment was 
ratified. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is directed at the vic-
tims of slavery: former slaves, southern Unionists, and others who might 
be subjected to similar deprivations in the future. That provision speaks 
of the rights to be enjoyed by persons or citizens. “No State,” the text de-
crees,  
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.66 
Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed at the 
persons who supported slavery and secession or states that might in the 
future seek to reestablish a racial caste system.67 Those provisions speak 
of the rights these persons do not have or shall no longer enjoy. Many of 
those rights had some constitutional support before 1868. 
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment asserts that the United 
States will reduce the number of state representatives in Congress should 
states deny the ballot “except for participation in rebellion, or other 
                                                 
64. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 490 (Daniel, J., concurring) (noting that slav-
ery was “the only private property which the Constitution has specifically recognised, and has 
imposed it as a direct obligation both on the States and the Federal Government to 
protect and enforce”).  
65. See Peter H. Schuck & Rogers M. Smith, Citizenship Without Consent: Illegal 
Aliens in the American Polity 72–89 (1985) (attributing inclusiveness of birthright citizen-
ship rule, in part, to efforts to overcome Dred Scott). 
66. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  
67. Id. amend. XIV, §§ 2–4.  
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crime.”68 This provision implies and has been interpreted as granting 
states the constitutional power to deny the ballot to persons previously 
convicted of felonies.69 Minor v. Happersett pointed to Section 2 as 
supporting claims that American citizens had no constitutional right to 
vote.70 Several state courts in the nineteenth century had reached a 
different conclusion, maintaining that American citizens who met rea-
sonable standards had a constitutional right to vote.71 If these state deci-
sions correctly concluded that male citizens enjoyed a federal constitu-
tional right to cast a ballot before the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, then Section 2 abolished preexisting constitutional rights.72 
At the very least, Section 2 strengthens constitutional claims that 
American citizens do not have the right to vote.  
Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment declares that no former 
state or federal office holder who “engaged in insurrection or rebellion 
against [the United States]” or gave “aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof” could hold state or federal office, unless a two-thirds majority in 
both Houses of Congress “remove[d] such disability.”73 This provision 
arguably modified federal constitutional rights to run for federal office,74 
probably repealed some state constitutional rights to run for state and 
federal office,75 and certainly added to the constitutional disabilities in 
Article I for being a federal or state officeholder.76 When rejecting state 
power to add qualifications for candidates to federal office, Justice 
                                                 
68. Id. amend. XIV, § 2.  
69. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (concluding “the exclusion of 
felons from the vote has an affirmative sanction in § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
70. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 174–75 (1874) (rejecting challenge to Missouri law grant-
ing only men right to vote and concluding in reference to Section 2 that “no such form of 
words would have been selected to express the idea . . . [that] suffrage was the absolute 
right of all citizens”). 
71. See, e.g., Green v. Shumway, 39 N.Y. 418, 420 (1868) (invalidating state law 
requiring voters to take oath as contrary to United States and New York constitutions). 
Minor and Green are discussed at more length below. See infra notes 134, 137 and 
accompanying text. 
72. William W. Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the “Right” to Vote, and 
the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 33, 39 (explaining 
Justice Harlan’s belief that Section 2 allowed states to deny certain voting rights). 
73. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 3.  
74. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972) (noting state laws that in practice 
inhibit persons from running for office violate constitutional right of voters to support 
candidate of their choice). 
75. Flack, supra note 60, at 132 (explaining Section 3 of Fourteenth Amendment had 
penal features which restricted most capable candidates in South from holding any office).  
76. Article I, Section 2 states, “No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have 
attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United 
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be 
chosen.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 2. Article I, Section 3 states, “No Person shall be a Senator 
who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the 
United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he 
shall be chosen.” Id. art. I, § 3.  
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Stevens’s majority opinion in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, “empha-
sized the egalitarian concept that the opportunity to be elected was [to 
be] open to all,” and that “sovereignty confers on the people the right to 
choose freely their representatives to the National Government.”77 This 
language suggests that Article I grants all persons who meet the constitu-
tional conditions the right to run for the national legislature (“the op-
portunity to be elected” is constitutionally “open to all”) and that 
Americans have a constitutional right to choose for the national legisla-
ture any person who meets all Article I conditions (“the right to choose 
freely their representatives”). At the very least, Section 3 imposed a new 
constitutional disability, if that provision did not repeal a previously exist-
ing constitutional right.  
Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment seems to abolish or repeal 
rights previously protected by the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. That section asserts,  
[N]either the United States nor any State shall assume or pay 
any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebel-
lion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or 
emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and 
claims shall be held illegal and void.78 
Antebellum Democrats repeatedly insisted that laws emancipating 
slaves without compensation unconstitutionally took property.79 During 
the Civil War, Representative Fernando Wood of New York stated that 
emancipation “appropriate[d] private property without due compensa-
tion or confiscate[d] it without the formality of trial and condemna-
tion.”80 Many Republicans agreed, at least before Lincoln issued the 
Emancipation Proclamation. Rejecting uncompensated emancipation as 
a war policy, Sidney Fisher in 1862 asserted, “[W]e cannot permit prop-
erty to be acquired under the law, and then take it away by law.”81 
The persons who drafted the Fourteenth Amendment knew how to 
add and how to subtract constitutional rights. Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the section that concerned the rights of for-
merly enslaved persons, plainly added constitutional rights. Sections 2, 3, 
and 4, the sections that concerned the rights of former slaveholders and 
                                                 
77. 514 U.S. 779, 793–94 (1995) (interpreting Court’s holding in Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)). 
78. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 4.  
79. James M. McPherson, The Illustrated Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era 
140 (2003) (examining debate around slaves as property in wake of Dred Scott decision). 
80. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2941 (1864) (statement of Rep. Fernando 
Wood); see also Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., 1483 (1864) (statement of Sen. 
Lazarus Powell) (asserting uncompensated emancipation of slaves proposed by Thirteenth 
Amendment would “destroy property”). 
81. Sidney George Fisher, The Trial of the Constitution 306 (1862). See generally, 
Daniel W. Hamilton, The Limits of Sovereignty: Property Confiscation in the Union and 
the Confederacy During the Civil War 41–56 (2007) (discussing property rights over slaves 
as part of larger discussion about Union confiscation of property in wartime). 
1516 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 112:1501 
 
their political allies, plainly subtracted constitutional rights or refuted 
possible Democratic interpretations of preexisting constitutional rights.82 
This structure provides additional confirmation of the already obvious 
claim that the Fourteenth Amendment in no way weakened or repealed 
the Thirteenth Amendment. 
The analysis in this Part suggests that, contrary to common notions, 
Americans have amended the Constitution to eliminate constitutional 
rights. The Thirteenth Amendment abolished constitutional rights pre-
viously enjoyed by slaveholders. The Fourteenth Amendment abolished 
rights previously enjoyed by slaveholders and their supporters. These ob-
servations do not, however, touch the central thesis of this Essay. For all 
the above reasons and many more, Harold Hyman seemed on excep-
tionally safe ground when asserting, “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment re-
pealed neither [the Thirteenth Amendment nor the Civil Rights Act of 
1866], and both are still on the books.”83 
II. THE CONSTITUTION IN REVERSE GEAR: THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
MINUS ONE 
The apparently obvious argument in Slaughter-House that the 
Fourteenth Amendment neither repealed nor modified the Thirteenth 
Amendment, on closer inspection, relies on premises that might justify 
the opposite conclusion. Justice Miller’s argument for an ever-expanding 
set of constitutional rights assumes a very narrow interpretation of the 
Thirteenth Amendment.84 If you substitute the Thirteenth Amendment 
rights that revivalists believe the constitutional ban on slavery protects, 
then the Slaughter-House opinion suggests that constitutional protections 
diminished substantially between the ratification of the constitutional 
ban on slavery and the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment. When 
the Bill of Rights was ratified, many Americans regarded the denial of 
political rights as a badge and incident of slavery.85 If Section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment provided constitutional foundations or support 
for claims that voting was not a privilege or immunity of citizenship, then 
the provision arguably eliminated one of the substantial rights entailed 
by the constitutional ban on slavery.86 The very existence of the 
Fourteenth Amendment contributes to a narrowing of Thirteenth 
                                                 
82. See Flack, supra note 60, at 97–136 (1908) (examining political process behind 
passage of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Fourteenth Amendment). 
83. Harold M. Hyman, Comment on Robert Kaczorowski’s Paper, The Chase Court and 
Fundamental Rights, 21 N. Ky. L. Rev. 193, 201 (1993). 
84. See supra notes 52–58 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Miller’s view of 
Thirteenth Amendment’s impact on scope of constitutional rights).  
85. See infra notes 121–124 and accompanying text (discussing historical American 
conceptions of link between slavery and denial of political rights). 
86. See infra notes 118–120 and accompanying text (arguing Thirteenth 
Amendment’s elimination of badges and incidents of slavery did not endow slaves with 
voting rights).  
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Amendment rights when the Constitution is read as a whole. On the 
common assumption that no constitutional provision was designed to be 
“mere surplusage,”87 the Constitution interpreted as a whole suggests that 
the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery only, while the Fourteenth 
Amendment declares the rights of newly freed slaves. The Thirteenth 
Amendment standing alone, from this perspective, protects more rights 
than a Thirteenth Amendment in a constitution that also includes 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A. Slaughter-House Revisited 
The Slaughter-House Cases construed the Thirteenth Amendment 
narrowly. Justice Miller maintained that “slavery” consisted only of “per-
sonal servitude.”88 While he admitted that the Thirteenth Amendment 
forbade more than slavery, Miller’s examples suggested that the only par-
ticular right essential to being a free man was a Hobbesian liberty of lo-
comotion.89 People are free if they are not in prison. “The exception of 
servitude as a punishment for crime,” Miller declared, “gives an idea of 
the class of servitude that is meant” by the Thirteenth Amendment.90 
Miller stated that the Thirteenth Amendment also forbade people from 
being reduced to “the condition of serfs attached to the plantation.”91 
Like prisoners, medieval serfs were not free to change their residence or 
employment. 
Miller’s interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment explains why 
his Slaughter-House opinion regarded the Black Codes as constitutional 
when enacted. Miller did not condemn on constitutional grounds laws 
that forbade African Americans “to appear in the towns in any other 
character than menial servants,” that “require[d] [them] to reside on 
and cultivate the soil without the right to purchase or own it,” and that 
“excluded” persons of color “from many occupations of gain, and [did 
not permit them] to give testimony in the courts in any case where a 
white man was a party.”92 Miller invoked the Black Codes only to explain 
why the Fourteenth Amendment had to supplement the Thirteenth 
Amendment. “[T]he condition of the slave race would,” Miller wrote, 
“without further protection of the Federal government, be almost as bad 
as it was before.”93 
                                                 
87. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). 
88. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 69 (1872).  
89. See Quentin Skinner, Hobbes and Republican Liberty 211 (2008) (explaining 
Hobbes’ vision of freedom is “simply to be unhindered from moving in accordance with 
one’s natural powers”).  
90. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 69.  
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 70. 
93. Id. 
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That Justice Miller almost certainly gave a crabbed reading of the 
Thirteenth Amendment has been well known to scholars since the classic 
works of Jacobus tenBroek and Harold Hyman and William Wiecek.94 
These scholars made the historical case that the persons responsible for 
the constitutional ban on involuntary servitude intended to protect a ro-
bust set of fundamental freedoms. TenBroek asserted, 
The amendment was presented not as one step in a series of 
steps yet to come, not as an act of partial fulfillment, not as the 
opportunistic achievement of a limited objective. It was exult-
antly held up as “the final step,” “the crowning act,” “the cap-
stone upon the sublime structure”; the joyous “consummation 
of abolitionism.” To the proponents of the amendment, though 
slavery was dead, the remote contingency of resurrection had to 
be provided against; the incidents of slavery had yet to be oblit-
erated; the emancipated negro and his white friends had to be 
protected in the privileges and civil liberties of free men; and 
the federal power as the instrument for achieving these pur-
poses had to be permanently assured.95 
Contemporary Thirteenth Amendment revivalists endorse this vision 
of the Thirteenth Amendment as protecting the fundamental rights of 
citizens and the natural rights of persons. Alexander Tsesis states that the 
Radical Republicans responsible for the Thirteenth Amendment “in-
tended that it provide Congress with the national authority to enact laws 
that would assure that freedom would not be a hollow word but a na-
tional commitment vested with substantive protections.”96 
Thirteenth Amendment revivalism has substantial historical support. 
Republicans in Congress gave numerous speeches in which they broadly 
defined the freedoms entailed by a constitutional ban on involuntary ser-
vitude. Senator James Harlan of Iowa maintained that the Thirteenth 
Amendment would protect family, property, political, educational, and 
legal rights. He informed Congress,  
[T]he prohibition of the conjugal relation is a necessary inci-
dent of slavery, and that slavery cannot or would not be main-
tained in the absence of such a regulation. 
. . . . 
                                                 
94. See Harold M. Hyman & William M. Wiecek, Equal Justice Under Law: 
Constitutional Development, 1835–75, at 477 (1982) (explaining after “constru[ing] the 
‘pervading purpose’ of the Civil War amendments to be the freedom of black people, 
Miller relegated freedmen, for the effective protection of their new freedom, to precisely 
those governments . . . least likely to respect either their rights or their freedom”); Jacobus 
tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: 
Consummation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 Calif. L. Rev. 171, 
189–94 (1951) (giving examples of narrow construction of Thirteenth Amendment); see 
also Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. 
Rev., 1, 20 (1995) (arguing “Slaughter-House Cases . . . constrained the application of the 
Thirteenth Amendment by narrowly defining involuntary servitude”). 
95. TenBroek, supra note 94, at 176. 
96. Tsesis, Legal History, supra note 6, at 38.  
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Another incident in the abolition practically of the parental 
relation, robbing the offspring of the care and attention of his 
parents, severing a relation which is universally cited as the em-
blem of the relation sustained by the Creator to the human fam-
ily. . . . But again, it abolishes necessarily the relation of person 
to property. It declares the slave to be incapable of acquiring 
and holding property, and that this disability shall extend to his 
offspring from generation to generation throughout the com-
ing ages. . . . 
. . . . 
But it also necessarily, as an incident of its continuance, 
deprives all those held to be slaves of a status in court. Having 
no rights to maintain and no legal wrongs to redress, they are 
held to be incapable of bring a suit in the courts of the United 
States. . . .  
. . . . 
And then another incident of this institution is the sup-
pression of the freedom of speech and of the press, not only 
among those down-trodden people themselves but among the 
white race. Slavery cannot exist when its merits can be freely 
discussed. . . . Its continuance also requires perpetuity of the ig-
norance of its victims. It is therefore made a felony to teach 
slaves to read and write.97 
Representative C.J. Ingersoll declared that the Thirteenth 
Amendment would protect both political and natural rights. He asserted,  
Sir, I am in favor in the fullest sense of personal liberty. I am in 
favor of the freedom of speech. . . . I am in favor of the adop-
tion of this amendment because it will secure to the oppressed 
slave his natural and God-given rights. I believe that the black 
man has certain inalienable rights, which are as sacred in the 
sight of Heaven as those of any other race. I believe he has a 
right to live, and live in a state of freedom. He has a right to 
breathe the free air and enjoy God’s free sunshine. He has a 
right to till the soil, to earn his bread by the sweat of his brow, 
and enjoy the rewards of his own labor. He has a right to the 
endearments and enjoyment of family ties; and no white man 
has any right to rob him or infringe on any of these blessings.98 
Similar quotations litter the Congressional Globe during the debates 
on the Thirteenth Amendment, the debates on the Freedman’s Bureau, 
and the debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Senator Lyman 
Trumbull, during the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866, detailed 
the broad congressional powers necessary to implement the constitu-
tional ban on slavery: 
                                                 
97. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1439 (1864) (statement of Sen. James Harlan). 
98. Id. at 2990 (statement of Rep. Charles Jared Ingersoll); see tenBroek, supra note 
94, at 176–81 (giving examples of supporters’ statements in “the congressional debates in 
the spring of 1864 and January 1865 [that] explode the traditionally accepted beliefs 
about the scope and meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment”). 
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I hold that we have a right to pass any law which, in our judg-
ment, is deemed appropriate, and which will accomplish the 
end in view, secure freedom to all people in the United States. 
The various State laws to which I have referred—and there are 
many others—although they do not make a man an absolute 
slave, yet deprive him of the rights of a freeman; and it is per-
haps difficult to draw the precise line, to say where freedom 
ceases and slavery begins, but a law that does not allow a col-
ored person to go from one county to another is certainly a law 
in derogation of the rights of a freeman. A law that does not al-
low a colored person to hold property, does not allow him to 
teach, does not allow him to preach, is certainly a law in viola-
tion of the rights of a freeman, and being so may properly be 
declared void.99 
When elaborating the rights protected by the Thirteenth 
Amendment, Representative William Lawrence asserted, 
Every citizen . . . has the absolute right to live, the right of per-
sonal security, personal liberty, and the right to acquire and en-
joy property. These are rights of citizenship. As necessary inci-
dents of these absolute rights, there are others, as the right to 
make and enforce contracts, to purchase, hold, and enjoy prop-
erty, and to share the benefit of laws for the security of person 
and property.100 
Substituting the Thirteenth Amendment as understood by James 
Harlan, Lyman Trumbull, and Jacobus tenBroek for Justice Miller’s anal-
ysis of that constitutional provision in Slaughter-House plays havoc with the 
conventional belief that Reconstruction witnessed an ongoing expansion 
of constitutional rights or three amendments with a single purpose. 
Thirteenth Amendment revivalists maintain that the Constitution of 1865 
protected the fundamental rights of citizens and the natural rights of 
persons.101 Miller maintained that the Constitution of 1873 protected nei-
ther the fundamental rights of citizens nor the natural rights of per-
sons.102 If both are right, some event or process must have taken place 
between 1865 and 1873 that repealed Thirteenth Amendment protec-
                                                 
99. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866) (statement of Sen. Lyman 
Trumbull). 
100. Id. at 1833 (statement of Rep. William Lawrence); see tenBroek, supra note 94, 
at 190–96 (giving examples of statements in third debate over Thirteenth Amendment). 
101. See Pope, supra note 15, at 190–92 (noting Thirteenth Amendment guarantees 
certain fundamental rights, yet text does not mention any such rights); see also Jones v. 
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 (1968) (explaining Thirteenth Amendment allows 
Congress to outlaw slavery and secure “the same right to make and enforce contracts, to 
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to inherit, purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as 
is enjoyed by white citizens”). 
102. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 82 (1872) (arguing “[t]he 
adoption of the first eleven amendments to the Constitution so soon after the original 
instrument was accepted, shows a prevailing sense of danger at that time from the Federal 
power”). 
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tions for fundamental freedoms and natural rights. The most obvious 
candidate is the framing and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Thirteenth Amendment revivalists avoid this potential dilemma by 
pointing to common assertions that Justice Miller misconstrued the post-
Civil War Amendments.103 In particular, numerous Justices and 
commentators insist that the Slaughter-House majority misconstrued the 
Fourteenth Amendment, most notably, the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause. Justices Field and Bradley reached that conclusion when dissent-
ing in Slaughter-House.104 In 2010, Justice Thomas rejected Justice Miller’s 
interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in McDonald v. 
City of Chicago.105 Thirteenth Amendment revivalists think Justice Miller’s 
Slaughter-House opinion, in addition to offering a crabbed reading of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, also too narrowly construed the Thirteenth 
Amendment. “[N]arrow judicial interpretations during the nineteenth 
century,” Tsesis writes, “undercut the [Thirteenth] Amendment’s effec-
tiveness.”106 Tsesis and others insist that the Constitution protected the 
same liberties in 1873 as it did in 1865.107 Justice Miller offered too nar-
row a conception of the rights protected in 1873, in this view, only be-
cause he had too narrow a conception of the rights protected in 1865. 
                                                 
103. Louis Lusky, By What Right?: A Commentary on the Supreme Court’s Power To 
Revise the Constitution 201 (1975) (arguing Justice Miller’s opinion ignored intent of 
framers); see also Leonard W. Levy, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, in 
Judgments: Essays on American Constitutional History 64, 69 (1972) (describing Miller’s 
majority opinion as “one of the most tragically wrong opinions ever given by the Court”); 
Thomas B. McAffee, Constitutional Interpretation—The Uses and Limitations of Original 
Intent, 12 U. Dayton L. Rev. 275, 282 (1986) (noting agreement among modern commen-
tators that Justice Miller’s opinion was “clearly wrong”).  
104. See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 97 (Field J., dissenting) (finding “[t]he privileges and 
immunities designated are those which of right belong to the citizens of all free governments”); id. 
at 119 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (arguing “[i]t was not necessary to say in words that the 
citizens of the United States should have and exercise all the privileges of citizens . . . . 
Their very citizenship conferred these privileges, if they did not possess them before.”).  
105. 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3085 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing “[t]here was no 
reason for the [Slaughter-House majority] to interpret the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
as putting the Court to the extreme choice of interpreting the ‘privileges and immunities’ 
of federal citizenship to mean either all . . . rights . . . or no rights at all”). 
106. Alexander Tsesis, Interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment, 11 U. Pa. J. Const. 
L. 1337, 1338 (2009). 
107. See Douglas L. Colbert, Affirming the Thirteenth Amendment, 1995 N.Y. Ann. 
Surv. Am. L. 403, 403 (discussing versatile use of Thirteenth Amendment to protect free-
doms and liberties, even more so than that of Fourteenth Amendment); see also Civil 
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (explaining Thirteenth 
Amendment suffered from excessively narrow judicial interpretation); tenBroek, supra 
note 94, at 172 (arguing prohibition of Thirteenth Amendment is absolute, not restricted 
like in Fourteenth Amendment, but freedom protected by latter is more comprehensive 
than Thirteenth Amendment). 
1522 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 112:1501 
 
Tsesis and others take a position that might be described as the 
“Leviathan”108 conception of the Thirteenth Amendment. On this read-
ing, the Thirteenth Amendment fully guaranteed the fundamental rights 
of citizens and the natural rights of persons. If interpreted correctly, no 
other constitutional rights amendment would be necessary. At best, the 
Fourteenth Amendment merely reiterates the rights protected by the 
Thirteenth Amendment. TenBroek declared that, in 1866, Republicans 
attempted “to do the same job all over again by another amendment.”109 
“The Fourteenth Amendment,” he concluded, merely “reenacted the 
Thirteenth Amendment and made the program of legislation designed 
to implement it constitutionally secure.”110 At worst, the Fourteenth 
Amendment protected only a subset of the rights protected by the 
Thirteenth Amendment. Nevertheless, that the Fourteenth Amendment 
protects fewer rights hardly entails that it repealed any part of the 
Thirteenth Amendment.  
The Leviathan conception of the Thirteenth Amendment is true to 
the common view that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to pro-
vide more secure foundations for legislation implementing 
Reconstruction. Democrats and Republicans offered different interpreta-
tions of the constitutional ban on involuntary servitude during the con-
gressional debates over the Civil Rights Act and Freedmen’s Bureau Act. 
Republicans insisted that the Thirteenth Amendment both emancipated 
slaves and guaranteed former slaves certain fundamental freedoms and 
natural rights.111 Lyman Trumbull declared that Americans in 1865 had 
secured “to all persons within the United States practical freedom.”112 
Democrats and a few Republicans responded that the Thirteenth 
Amendment did little more than emancipate slaves.113 Senator Thomas 
Hendricks of Indiana argued,  
                                                 
108. Hobbes described the “Leviathan” as containing those elements that “gav[e] life 
and motion to the whole body.” Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: Parts I and II 1 (A.P. 
Martinich & Brian Battiste eds., Broadview Press rev. ed. 2011) (1651). So the Leviathan 
conception of the Thirteenth Amendment encompasses the entire domain of rights and 
liberties. 
109. TenBroek, supra note 94, at 201. 
110. Id. at 203. 
111. Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery and a 
Reconstructed Civil Rights Agenda, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 981, 1010–12 (explaining 
Republicans hoped Thirteenth Amendment would guarantee fundamental rights for 
slaves and formerly freed slaves, and quoting James Garfield as remarking, “What is free-
dom? . . . Is it the bare privilege of not being chained?” and “If this is all, then freedom is a 
bitter mockery, a cruel delusion”).  
112. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (statement of Sen. Lyman 
Trumbull). 
113. Azmy, supra note 111, at 1022 (explaining that opponents of Thirteenth 
Amendment believed it was “absurd promise of equality for freedmen”); see also Andrew 
Johnson, Veto Message, Mar. 27, 1866, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=71978&st=veto&st1= (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (justifying veto 
of civil rights bill because “[s]lavery has been abolished, and at present nowhere exists 
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It is claimed that under this second section Congress may do 
anything necessary, in its judgment, not only to secure the free-
dom of the negro, but to secure to him all civil rights that are 
secured to white people. I deny that construction, and it will be 
a very dangerous construction to adopt. The first section abol-
ishes slavery. The second section provides that Congress may 
enforce the abolition of slavery “by appropriate legislation.” 
What is slavery? It is not a relation between the slave and the 
State; it is not a public relation; it is a relation between two per-
sons whereby the conduct of the one is placed under the will of 
the other. It is purely and entirely a domestic relation, and is so 
classed by all law writers; the law regulates that relation as it 
regulates other domestic relations. This constitutional amend-
ment broke asunder this private relation between the master 
and his slave, and the slave then, so far as the right of the master 
was concerned, became free; but did the slave, under that 
amendment, acquire any other right than to be free from the 
control of his master? The law of the State which authorized this 
relation is abrogated and annulled by this provision of the 
Federal Constitution, but no new rights are conferred upon the 
freedman.114 
The Fourteenth Amendment settled this debate. After 1868, no 
doubt existed that the Constitution both emancipated slaves and guaran-
teed newly freed slaves and others certain substantive rights. The “one 
point upon which historians of the Fourteenth Amendment all 
agree . . . , which the evidence places beyond cavil,” tenBroek states, “is 
that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to place the constitution-
ality of the Freedmen’s Bureau and Civil Rights Bills . . . beyond 
doubt.”115 
The problem with the Leviathan conception of the Thirteenth 
Amendment is that Republicans, when clarifying that the Constitution 
both freed slaves and protected the fundamental freedoms of newly freed 
slaves, may have undermined some rights originally protected by the 
Thirteenth Amendment and thus buttressed the Democratic claim that 
                                                                                                                 
within the jurisdiction of the United States; nor has there been . . . any attempt to revive it 
by the people or the States”).  
114. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 318 (1866) (statement of Sen. Thomas 
Hendricks). 
115. TenBroek, supra note 94, at 200; see also William E. Nelson, The Fourteenth 
Amendment: From Political Principle to Judicial Doctrine 48 (1988) (describing how pro-
ponents of Civil Rights Act of 1866 justified its constitutionality by relying on Thirteenth 
Amendment and how Democrats and President Johnson were skeptical of this theory). 
Whether Republicans intended to do much more than provide more secure constitutional 
foundations for the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is the main matter on which students of the 
Fourteenth Amendment disagree. Compare Berger, supra note 27 (arguing supporters in 
Congress thought Section 1 proposed relatively modest changes), with Walter F. Murphy, 
Constitutional Interpretation: The Art of the Historian, Magician, or Statesman?, 87 Yale 
L.J. 1752 (1978) (concluding Berger’s interpretation of Congress’s narrow understanding 
of “privileges and immunities” is flawed). 
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the Thirteenth Amendment was limited to emancipation. As previously 
noted, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment weakens the constitu-
tional connection between citizenship and voting rights.116 By doing so, 
that provision also weakened the constitutional argument made by many 
framers and some Republicans that laws limiting the male voting rights 
were a form of enslavement.117 The very existence of the Fourteenth 
Amendment may have changed the meaning of the Thirteenth 
Amendment. When the Constitution was read as a whole after 1868, 
Americans could easily conclude that the Thirteenth Amendment con-
tained the provision that emancipated slaves, while the Fourteenth 
Amendment contained the provisions that protected the rights of newly 
freed slaves. By making the Fourteenth Amendment carry the burden of 
protecting rights, Republicans in 1869 both enfeebled the Thirteenth 
Amendment and probably limited the fundamental constitutional free-
doms of emancipated slaves and all Americans. 
B. The Fourteenth Amendment Revisited 
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment undermines claims that the 
Thirteenth Amendment protects political rights. When the Constitution 
was ratified, Americans believed that the lack of political rights was a de-
fining characteristic of human bondage.118 Charles Sumner and other 
Republican Radicals relied on this understanding of servitude when pro-
posing voting rights legislation as a means for implementing the constitu-
tional ban on involuntary servitude.119 Other Republicans disputed this 
historical connection between citizenship and access to the ballot.120 By 
declaring that states could deny voting rights to male citizens, the 
Fourteenth Amendment put a strong thumb on one side of this debate, 
                                                 
116. See supra text accompanying notes 84–99; see also Van Alstyne, supra note 72, 
at 38–60 (explaining different arguments relating to Section 2 of Fourteenth 
Amendment’s power over suffrage). 
117. See generally The Reconstruction Amendments’ Debates, supra note 25, at 108 
(anthologizing debates around Freedmen’s Bureau Bill); see also Cong. Globe, 39th 
Cong., 1st Sess. app. 219 (1866) (statement of Sen. Timothy Howe) (stating that Black 
Codes, which included denying Blacks right to vote, deny “the plainest and most necessary 
rights of citizenship”); id. at 1151 (statement of Rep. Martin Thayer) (arguing that Black 
Codes are being used to “reduce this class of people to the condition of bondmen”). 
118. See infra notes 125–128 and accompanying text (discussing emphasis placed on 
voting rights).  
119. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1124 (1866) (statement of Rep. 
Burton Cook) (arguing that Black Codes “practically reduce these men to the condition of 
slavery”); id. at 603 (statement of Sen. Henry Wilson) (arguing that Black Codes “make 
slaves of men whom we have made free”). 
120. Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 
Mich. L. Rev. 245, 270 n.105 (1997) (explaining that moderate Republicans in Congress 
believed in granting Blacks “civil rights” but few believed Blacks should have been granted 
“political rights” such as voting).  
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substantially weakening preexisting claims that being denied political 
rights was a badge or incident of slavery. 
American Revolutionaries equated the possession of political rights 
with freedom.121 To be a citizen was to have political rights. The opposite 
of citizen was slave (if one was not an alien—or virtually represented as 
was thought to be the case with women and children). When the Framers 
declared, “We are slaves,” they were referring to the denial of political 
rights. Consider the following collection of assertions colonists made 
when opposing the Townshend Revenue Act of 1767: 
“For what slavery can be more compleat,” rhetorically asked a 
Philadelphia Grand Jury, “more miserable, more disgraceful, 
than that lot of a people” that was governed by laws not of their 
own making. John Dickinson, who became a central figure in 
the Continental Congress, wrote in a similar fashion that per-
sons who were taxed without their consent were in “a state of 
the most abject slavery.” The same year, Silas Downer, the corre-
sponding secretary of the Sons of Liberty for Rhode Island, de-
nounced taxation without Americans’ consent to be the “the 
lowest bottom of slavery.” The Tea Act, through which 
Parliament imposed the tax on tea that spurred the Boston Tea 
Party in December 1773, was viewed as the “[e]nsign of their 
arbitrary Dominion and your Slavery.” In dramatic fashion, 
Josiah Quincy proclaimed that “We are slaves!” of the British 
oppressors. The implication, as another pamphleteer remarked, 
was that persons who were not treated as “subjects”—or “citi-
zens,” in modern terminology—were slaves.122 
The “slavery” reference in each comment refers to an absence of po-
litical rights. Thomas Jefferson made the same connection between free-
dom and political rights when in 1774 he asked, “does his majesty seri-
ously wish . . . that his subjects should give up the glorious right of repre-
sentation, with all the benefits derived from that, and submit themselves 
the absolute slaves of his sovereign will?”123 Further, some framers in-
                                                 
121. See Alexander Tsesis, A Civil Rights Approach: Achieving Revolutionary 
Abolitionism Through the Thirteenth Amendment, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1773, 1799 
(2006) (explaining abolitionist theory that “slavery was the worst of all robberies” in part 
because it denied slaves political rights). 
122. Id. at 1782–83 (alteration in original) (quoting Order of Philadelphia Grand 
Jury (Sept. 24, 1770), in Bos. Evening-Post, Nov. 5, 1770; John Dickinson, Letters from a 
Farmer in Pennsylvania, to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies 93 (1774); Silas Downer, 
A Discourse, Delivered in Providence, in the Colony of Rhode-Island, upon the 25th Day 
of July 1768, at the Dedication of the Tree of Liberty, from the Summer House in the Tree 
10 (Providence, John Waterman 1768); Hampden, The Alarm (No. III) 1 (1773); Josiah 
Quincy, Jun’r., Observations on the Act of Parliament Commonly Called the Boston Port-
Bill 69 (Boston, Edes and Gill 1774); David Parker, An Argument in Defence of the 
Exclusive Right Claimed by the Colonies to Tax Themselves 92 (London, Brotherton and 
Sewell 1774)). 
123. Thomas Jefferson, A Summary View of the Rights of British America, in 1 The 
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 429, 441 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s 
Sons 1892). 
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sisted that a form of enslavement took place when slaveholders were de-
prived of their slaves without their political consent.124 
Prominent Republicans after the Civil War sought to maintain this 
eighteenth-century connection between freedom and political rights. 
Charles Sumner, during the debates over the Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 
1866, vigorously championed the notion that Congress could protect the 
right to vote when implementing the Thirteenth Amendment. He as-
serted, 
The ballot is a protector. Perhaps, at the present moment, this is 
its highest function. Slavery has ceased in name; but this is all. 
The old masters still assert an inhuman power, and now by posi-
tive statutes seek to bind the freedman in new chains. . . . To 
save the freedman from this tyranny, with all its accumulated 
outrage, is your solemn duty. For this we are now devising guar-
antees; but, believe me, the only sufficient guarantee is the bal-
lot. Let the freedman vote, and he will have in himself under 
the law a constant, ever-present, self-protecting power. The ar-
mor of citizenship will be his best security. The ballot will be to 
him sword and buckler—a sword with which to pierce his ene-
mies, and a buckler on which to receive their assault. Its posses-
sion alone will be a terror and a defense. The law, which is the 
highest reason, boasts that every man's house is his castle; but 
the freedman can have no castle without the ballot. When the 
master knows that he may be voted down, he will know that he 
must be just, and everything is contained in justice. . . . To him 
who has the ballot all other things shall be given—protection, 
opportunity, education, a homestead.125 
Almost immediately after the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified, 
the most antislavery wing of the Republican Party launched “a campaign 
to convince Northern public opinion that suffrage was ‘the logical se-
quence of negro emancipation.’”126 “[A]ll Radicals,” Eric Foner states, 
“could unite on the principle that without black suffrage there could be 
no Reconstruction.”127 
Many Republicans contested the connections Radicals drew between 
freedom and political rights.128 Abraham Lincoln identified slavery 
strictly with the denial of economic rights. In his first debate with 
Stephen Douglas, Lincoln asserted,  
                                                 
124. See Peter Kolchin, American Slavery: 1619–1877, at 91 (1993) (explaining many 
Southerners thought “infringing on their right to own slaves was a violation of their lib-
erty”). 
125. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 685 (1866) (statement of Sen. Charles 
Sumner). 
126. Foner, supra note 2, at 221 (1988).  
127. Id. 
128. See Saunders, supra note 120, at 270 (explaining few moderate Republicans be-
lieved in granting Blacks same “political” rights, and even fewer wanted to grant Blacks full 
“social” equality). 
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I have no purpose to introduce political and social equality be-
tween the white and the black races. . . . [B]ut I hold that not-
withstanding all this, there is no reason in the world why the 
negro is not entitled to all the natural rights enumerated in the 
Declaration of Independence, the right to life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness. I hold that he is as much entitled to these 
as the white man. I agree with Judge Douglas he is not my equal 
in many respects. . . . But in the right to eat the bread, without 
leave of anybody else, which his own hand earns, he is my equal 
and the equal of Judge Douglas, and the equal of every living man.129 
In other debates with Douglas, Lincoln asserted that he had never 
“complained especially of the Dred Scott decision because it declared . . . 
that a negro could not be a citizen” and that he opposed making Blacks 
citizens of Illinois.130 Conservative and moderate Republicans during the 
debates over the Fourteenth Amendment agreed that being denied polit-
ical rights was not a badge or incident of slavery. Republican 
Representative John R. McBride of Oregon “den[ied] the conclusion” 
that “if we emancipate we must enfranchise also.” He stated, “a recogni-
tion of natural rights is one thing, a grant of political franchises is quite 
another.”131  
The relationship between freedom and political rights was sharply 
contested in state constitutional law during the years between the ratifi-
cation of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. During and im-
mediately after the Civil War, many states passed laws requiring voters to 
swear that they had always been loyal to the Union.132 Some state courts 
declared these laws unconstitutional. Others sustained those measures.133 
The crucial issue in these cases was the constitutional connection be-
tween citizenship and voting. The state judges that declared these loyalty 
oaths unconstitutional insisted that voting was one of the most important 
privileges of (male) citizenship. In Green v. Shumway, the New York Court 
of Appeals described voting as one of the “most inestimable and invalua-
ble privileges of a free government.”134 State courts that sustained loyalty 
oaths rejected claims that freedom or citizenship entailed voting rights. 
                                                 
129. Abraham Lincoln, First Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Ottawa, Illinois, in 3 
The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 16 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
130. Abraham Lincoln, Seventh and Last Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Alton, 
Illinois, in The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, supra note 129, at 299. 
131. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 202 (1865) (statement of Rep. John 
McBride); see also Nelson, supra note 115, at 125–32 (detailing Republican positions on 
suffrage).  
132. See Michael A. Ross, Loyalty Oaths, in 3 Encyclopedia of the American Civil 
War: A Political, Social, and Military History 1230, 1230 (David S. Heidler & Jeanne T. 
Heidler eds., 2000) (describing loyalty oaths during Civil War).  
133. Id. (listing Missouri, Tennessee, Maryland, and Louisiana as all having rigorous 
loyalty laws to restrict voting and describing court challenges).  
134. 39 N.Y. 418, 421 (1868); see also Rison v. Farr, 24 Ark. 161, 171 (1865) (“The 
right of suffrage in this state . . . is at least a constitutional right, and . . . any law infringing 
upon that right as vested by the constitution is null and void.”). 
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In Anderson v. Baker, the Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled, 
“[c]itizenship and suffrage are by no means inseparable; the latter is not 
one of the universal inalienable rights with which men are endowed by 
their Creator, but is altogether conventional.”135 The Supreme Court, 
without written opinions, divided four-to-four on the constitutionality of 
requiring voters to take these loyalty oaths.136 
The Fourteenth Amendment strengthened the case against treating 
the denial of political rights as a badge or incident of slavery. After the 
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, opponents of universal suffrage 
could and did point to Section 2 as providing foundations for their re-
strictive policies. Most notably, Chief Justice Waite in Minor v. Happersett 
relied heavily on the language of Section 2 when rejecting assertions that 
the post-Civil War Amendments enfranchised women. After quoting the 
text, he stated, “no such form of words would have been selected . . . if 
suffrage was the absolute right of all citizens.”137 Section 2 does not abso-
lutely bar constitutional protection for voting rights. The Warren Court 
held that voting was a fundamental interest under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.138 Nevertheless, at the very least, 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment considerably weakened the 
constitutional case for using the Thirteenth Amendment to make the 
framing link between freedom and political rights.  
C. The Constitution as a Whole 
The persons responsible for the Constitution intended the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to be read as a whole, not as 
two discrete provisions that might be found in two distinct documents. 
The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in large part because of politi-
cal and legal developments that were inhibiting congressional implemen-
tation of the Thirteenth Amendment. Thus, in order to understand what 
the Fourteenth Amendment means, we must understand the different 
understandings of the Thirteenth Amendment that were championed 
                                                 
135. 23 Md. 531, 619 (1865); see also Blair v. Ridgely, 41 Mo. 63, 175 (1867) (“[N]o 
person either has or can exercise the elective franchise as a natural right, and he only re-
ceives it upon entering the social compact, subject to such qualifications as may be 
prescribed.”). 
136. See Harold Melvin Hyman, Era of the Oath: Northern Loyalty Tests During the 
Civil War and Reconstruction 117 (1954) (explaining “[i]n 1865 the Court of Appeals 
sustained the provision, deciding that suffrage is not a property right and is controllable by 
the state”). 
137. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 174–75 (1874) (explaining language of Section 2 does 
not grant universal suffrage). 
138. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668–70 (1966) (declining to 
qualify principle that voting is fundamental interest by sustaining state poll tax); see also 
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) (explaining decisions 
concerning which resident citizens may participate in election of public officials “must be 
carefully scrutinized by the Court to determine whether each resident citizen has, as far as 
is possible, an equal voice in the selections”).  
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during early Reconstruction. The Fourteenth Amendment was grounded 
in some of those different understandings, but not others. Thus, in order 
to understand what the Thirteenth Amendment came to mean after 
1868, we need to understand which conceptions of the constitutional ban 
on involuntary servitude survived and which were discarded when the 
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. 
That the Fourteenth Amendment modified the Thirteenth should 
not be surprising. Constitutional amendments, often by their very exist-
ence, change the rights protected and the powers granted by preexisting 
constitutional provisions. New constitutional provisions introduce, but-
tress, or undermine those broader regime principles that had structured 
the proper interpretation of previously adopted constitutional provisions. 
The adoption of the Twelfth Amendment, which declared that the 
President and Vice President would run on a common ticket, weakened 
the anti-party commitments of the Constitution of 1789.139 Constitutional 
amendments are commonly based on assumptions about how other con-
stitutional provisions are best interpreted. The framers in 1869 declared, 
“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws” because they believed the national government 
was already constitutionally committed to equality.140 
Constitutional commentators have detailed how new constitutional 
amendments adjust the rights protected by preexisting constitutional 
provisions, even when recently ratified provisions do not explicitly repeal 
or augment past rights’ guarantees. Critical race and feminist theories 
maintain that the Fourteenth Amendment withdrew First Amendment 
protection from hate speech. Proponents of reverse incorporation argue 
that the Fourteenth Amendment increased First Amendment protection 
for antislavery speech and analogous forms of political dissent. By under-
standing how the Fourteenth Amendment altered the rights protected by 
the First Amendment, we may better understand how the Fourteenth 
Amendment altered the rights protected by the Thirteenth Amendment. 
Prominent critical and feminist theories assert that the post-Civil 
War Amendments provided the national government with the power to 
ban certain forms of racist invective that were constitutionally protected 
in 1791. Catherine MacKinnon sharply criticizes the view that “the up-
heaval that produced the Reconstruction Amendments did not move the 
ground under the expressive freedom, setting new limits and mandating 
                                                 
139. See U.S. Const. amend. XII (providing that Electors “shall name in their ballots 
the person voted for as President, and in the distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice 
President”).  
140. See Mark A. Graber, A Constitutional Conspiracy Unmasked: Why “No State” 
Does Not Mean “No State,” 10 Const. Comment. 87, 90 (1993) (arguing “[l]eading partic-
ipants in the debate over the Fourteenth Amendment treated as common knowledge the 
proposition that the pre-Civil War Constitution already prohibited federal laws incon-
sistent with equal protection”). 
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new extensions.”141 She excoriates those who believe that “Fourteenth 
Amendment equality . . . can be achieved while the First Amendment 
protects the speech of inequality.”142 MacKinnon thinks that once 
Americans reinterpret the First Amendment in light of the Fourteenth, 
they will easily be able to distinguish constitutional restrictions on hate 
speech from unconstitutional restrictions on the advocacy of progressive 
reform. “The piously evenhanded treatment of the Klan and NAACP 
boycotters,” in her view, ignores the fact that “the Klan was promoting 
inequality and the civil rights leaders were resisting it, in a country that is 
supposedly not constitutionally neutral on the subject.”143 
Other critical race theorists maintain that the Fourteenth 
Amendment established a new compelling interest for restricting other-
wise constitutionally protected speech. Charles Lawrence asserts that 
Americans became constitutionally committed to racial equality in 
1868.144 This constitutional commitment, he maintains, justified both 
Brown v. Board of Education and bans on hate speech. Lawrence interprets 
Brown as holding “that segregated schools were unconstitutional primar-
ily because of the message segregation conveys—the message that black 
children are an untouchable caste, unfit to be educated with white chil-
dren.”145 In his view, if the Constitution as amended in 1868 forbids gov-
ernment from delivering certain messages, then that same Constitution 
“commit[s] us to some regulation of racist speech” that could not be 
constitutionally proscribed before the Civil War.146  
One need not endorse the strongest version of the critical race and 
feminist defense of restrictions on hate speech to acknowledge the possi-
bility that the Fourteenth Amendment permitted government to regulate 
some speech that was previously protected by the First Amendment. The 
post-Civil War Amendments make promoting racial equality a legitimate 
government purpose. To the extent that one takes a nineteenth-century 
view of individual rights, which regards government regulations as consti-
tutional whenever the regulation clearly serves a public purpose,147 then 
bans on hate speech passed after 1868 pass constitutional muster. Even if 
                                                 
141. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Only Words 71 (1994).  
142. Id. at 72. 
143. Id. at 86. 
144. Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on 
Campus, in Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First 
Amendment 53, 59 (1993) (arguing “equal citizenship” is “a principle central to any sub-
stantive understanding of the equal protection clause, the foundation on which all anti-
discrimination law rests”). 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 58–59. 
147. See Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of 
Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence 7–9 (1993) (exploring “evidence of the late-nine-
teenth century legal community’s obsession with drawing distinctions between legitimate 
promotions of the public interest and illegitimate efforts to impose special burdens and 
benefits”). 
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one takes the more modern view that bans on speech must be narrowly 
tailored to serve compelling government interests,148 the post-Civil War 
Amendments suggest that restrictions designed to curtail white suprem-
acy serve compelling government ends. A good deal of dispute may take 
place over whether particular restrictions on racist invective are necessary 
or narrowly tailored,149 but the constitutional commitment to racial 
equality announced by the Fourteenth Amendment obviates debate over 
whether such measures satisfy the government interest prong of modern 
constitutional balancing tests. In short, the Fourteenth Amendment at 
the very least substantially weakened the constitutional foundations for 
claims that the First Amendment protects racist and sexist expression. 
Several studies of incorporation provide reasons for thinking that 
the Fourteenth Amendment also expanded the rights protected by the 
First Amendment. Proponents of incorporation claim that the persons 
responsible for the Privileges and Immunities Clause (or the Due Process 
Clause) of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to prohibit state gov-
ernments from violating the liberties in the first eight amendments to the 
Constitution.150 Champions of incorporation also argue that the 
Fourteenth Amendment intended that state and federal authorities be 
bound by the same constitutional standards when regulating speech, re-
ligion, and other matters enumerated in the Bill of Rights.151 If the First 
Amendment prohibited the federal government from banning flag burn-
ing, then the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited states from banning 
flag burning. If, after 1868, the Court ruled that the Fourteenth 
Amendment protected the right to stage a protest near a funeral for a 
fallen soldier, then the Justices as a matter of stare decisis were obligated 
to rule that the same speech was protected by the First Amendment.152 
These constitutional commitments to incorporation and uniformity, 
                                                 
148. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 
2817 (2011) (applying strict scrutiny to government-imposed restrictions on campaign 
expenditures). 
149. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 863–64 (E.D. Mich. 1989) 
(finding university policy prohibiting discriminatory speech was not narrowly tailored to 
survive strict scrutiny). 
150. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71–72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (ex-
plaining “that the provisions of the Amendment’s first section . . . were intended to . . . 
make the Bill of Rights, applicable to the states”); Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall 
Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights 165 (1986) (noting “[t]he 
privileges or immunities clause was the primary vehicle through which [Republicans] in-
tended to force the states to obey the commands of the Bill of Rights”). 
151. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035 (2010) (explaining 
“incorporated Bill of Rights protections ‘are all to be enforced against the States under the 
Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that protect those personal 
rights against federal encroachment’” (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964))).  
152. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (finding First Amendment of-
fers special protection for speech in public places on matters of public concern). 
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when combined, entail that Americans, by ratifying the Fourteenth 
Amendment, changed the rights protected by the First Amendment.  
The persons responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment wished to 
provide constitutional protection for specific utterances that the First 
Amendment in 1791 may not have covered. Republicans were particu-
larly concerned with preventing states from punishing antislavery speech 
or, the post-Civil War equivalent, pro-Reconstruction speech. The 
Republican Party in 1856 adopted the slogan, “Free Speech, Free Press, 
Free Men, Free Labor, Free Territory, and Frémont.”153 Party members 
reiterated that commitment to expression rights during the debates over 
the Fourteenth Amendment and Reconstruction measures. Proponents 
of the Fourteenth Amendment condemned antebellum Southern laws 
that “‘proscribed democratic literature as incendiary’” and “‘nullified 
constitutional guarantees of freedom and free speech and a free 
press.’”154 Whether the First Amendment originally protected antislavery 
speech is, however, contested. Leonard Levy maintains that the persons 
responsible for the Bill of Rights provided constitutional protection only 
against prior restraint.155 Michael Kent Curtis’s study of antebellum free 
speech debates demonstrates that Americans in 1868 had a more expan-
sive understanding of free speech than Americans had in 1791.156 
Virtually all constitutional decisionmakers in slave states and many in the 
North had no problem finding restrictions on antislavery speech con-
sistent with constitutional guarantees for speech rights. Governor Marcy 
of New York in 1836 responded to Southern demands that abolitionists 
be legally muzzled by proposing legislation that provided criminal sanc-
tions for persons whose speech was “calculated and intended to excite 
insurrection and rebellion in a sister State.”157 
Republicans achieved their goal of providing a uniform national 
standard of free-speech protection that encompassed protection for anti-
slavery dissent by a process sometimes called reverse incorporation. 
Reverse incorporation, Akhil Amar writes, occurs when “the federal gov-
ernment is obligated to abide by the same constitutional duty . . . that is 
                                                 
153. Richard H. Sewell, Ballots for Freedom: Antislavery Politics in the United States, 
1837–1860, at 284 (1976). 
154. Michael Kent Curtis, “Free Speech, The People’s Darling Privilege”: Struggles 
for Freedom of Expression in American History 364 (2000) [hereinafter Curtis, Free 
Speech] (quoting 2 The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 1031 (Bernard Schwartz 
ed., 1971)); see also id. at 216–372 (discussing free speech during post-Reconstruction 
era). 
155. Leonard W. Levy, Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech and Press in Early 
American History 234–48 (1985) [hereinafter Levy, Legacy].  
156. Curtis, Free Speech, supra note 154, at 52–116. 
157. Id. at 185; see also State v. Worth, 52 N.C. (7 Jones) 488, 493 (1860) (upholding 
state law that prohibited publication and circulation of book with intent to “disturb the 
happiness and repose of the country”); Curtis, Free Speech, supra note 154, at 182–205 
(describing North’s demand for legal action against Southern abolitionists). 
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imposed upon the states.”158 Bolling v. Sharpe is the best known instance 
of this process.159 In Bolling, the Supreme Court held that the federal gov-
ernment had the same obligation to desegregate public schools under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as states did under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.160 “In view of 
our decision [in Brown v. Board of Education] that the Constitution pro-
hibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools,” 
Chief Justice Warren asserted, “it would be unthinkable that the same 
Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.”161 
One crucial feature of reverse incorporation is that new constitutional 
amendments limiting state power alter the rights protected by preexist-
ing constitutional provisions limiting federal power. The Bolling Court 
ruled that ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment added a right not 
to be a victim of federal racial discrimination to the Fifth Amendment.162 
Republicans during Reconstruction similarly employed reverse incorpo-
ration when their ratification of a constitutional amendment protecting 
antislavery dissent against state regulation added antislavery advocacy to 
the utterances protected by the First Amendment.163 
Distinguished constitutional scholars champion reverse incorpora-
tion. Laurence Tribe suggests that persons “comfortable with . . . ‘time 
travel’ . . . [might] treat[] the history of the late 1860s as somehow 
changing the meaning of a constitutional provision ratified in 1789.”164 
Akhil Amar agrees that ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment 
changed the rights protected by the First Amendment: He thinks “the 
Fourteenth Amendment has a doctrinal ‘feedback effect’ against the fed-
eral government, despite the amendment's clear textual limitation to 
state action.”165 Amar concludes that “the parallel language between the 
First Amendment and the Fourteenth, should strongly incline us toward 
a unitary theory of freedom of speech against both state and federal gov-
ernments.”166 
                                                 
158. Akhil Reed Amar, Constitutional Rights in a Federal System: Rethinking 
Incorporation and Reverse Incorporation, in Benchmarks: Great Controversies in the 
Supreme Court 71, 79 (Terry Eastland ed., 1983).  
159. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).  
160. Id. at 500 (“[R]acial segregation in the public schools of the District of 
Columbia is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.”).  
161. Id. (referring to Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
162. Id. at 499 (explaining even though Fifth Amendment does not contain equal 
protection clause like Fourteenth Amendment, “the concepts of equal protection and due 
process . . . are not mutually exclusive”).  
163. See generally Mark A. Graber, Ántebellum Perspectives on Free Speech, 10 Wm. 
& Mary Bill Rts. J. 779, 802–05 (2002) (explaining that “Republicans could, without con-
tradiction, nationalize free speech protections” by “treating the Reconstruction amend-
ments as incorporating previous constitutional settlements outside of courts”). 
164. 1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 902 n.221 (3d ed. 2000). 
165. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights 243 (1998). 
166. Id. at 244. 
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These scholars recognize that reverse incorporation is one manifes-
tation of the broader principle that constitutional amendments inevitably 
revise preexisting constitutional rights and powers by introducing, but-
tressing, or undermining more fundamental understandings about the 
nature of the constitutional regime. The constitutional amendments 
passed in the Progressive Era that provided for the direct election of sen-
ators and gave women the right to vote were also part of the process by 
which Americans began to understand their regime as a constitutional 
democracy rather than a constitutional republic.167 These alterations in 
the foundations of American constitutionalism often compel constitu-
tional decisionmakers to rethink the rights protected by constitutional 
provisions superficially untouched by the new constitutional amendment. 
Constitutional decisionmakers must, therefore, recognize previous un-
derstandings of the constitutional rights Americans enjoy in light of the 
impact of new amendments on basic regime principles. Tribe writes, 
A revision to avoid conflicts with new constitutional text occurs 
when a constitutional amendment so alters the rest of the 
Constitution that, upon referring back to the constitutional 
provision in question, we are bound—unless we are satisfied 
with a Constitution that merely collects contradictions—to rec-
ognize a revision in that constitutional provision even if the 
amendment did not in so many words decree a change in that 
provision’s words.168 
Stephen Feldman details how constitutional thinkers toughened 
constitutional standards for government regulation of political dissent 
after Americans became more committed to pluralist notions of constitu-
tional democracy.169 
Bruce Ackerman plays a variation on this theme when he emphasizes 
the “problem of multigeneration synthesis.”170 Constitutional 
decisionmakers after a constitutional moment, he maintains, must first 
“identify which aspects of the earlier Constitution had survived,” and 
then “synthesize them into a new doctrinal whole that g[ives] expression 
to the new ideals” ratified by the American people.171 Constitutional 
amendments often require the same process writ small. Once constitu-
tional decisionmakers have determined that a new amendment entails a 
constitutional commitment to racial equality or to uniform standards of 
rights protections, they must adjust all their understandings of the rights 
provided by preexisting rights provisions so that they reflect newly 
                                                 
167. See Thomas M. Keck, Symposium on America’s Constitution: A Biography, 59 
Syracuse L. Rev. 31, 60 (2008) (arguing “constitutional amendment[s] during the progres-
sive era . . . deepen[ed] the Constitution’s commitment to democracy”). 
168. Tribe, supra note 164, at 67. 
169. Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America: A History 
291–419 (2008). 
170. Ackerman, supra note 44, at 88.  
171. Id. at 88–89. 
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adopted or strengthened constitutional principles. For example, even 
though the matter remained unstated in Justice Douglas’s majority opin-
ion in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, that state poll taxes were de-
clared unconstitutional almost immediately after Americans ratified a 
constitutional amendment prohibiting poll taxes in federal elections 
does not seem a coincidence.172 
Immediately after the Civil War, Americans found a related path for 
having a constitutional amendment alter the rights protected by a preex-
isting constitutional provision. The Fourteenth Amendment was a conse-
quence of a debate over the Thirteenth Amendment. Republicans main-
tained the Thirteenth Amendment banned slavery and guaranteed cer-
tain substantive freedoms.173 Democrats and some Republicans insisted 
that the Thirteenth Amendment only banned slavery.174 The Fourteenth 
Amendment settled this controversy. After 1868, general agreement ex-
isted that the Constitution of the United States banned slavery and pro-
tected certain substantive freedoms. Both the constitutional text and his-
tory suggest, however, that this debate was settled by transferring from 
the Thirteenth to the Fourteenth Amendment most of the substantive 
rights Republicans in 1865 maintained were guaranteed by the 
Thirteenth Amendment. Several good reasons exist for thinking that 
Republicans secured these fundamental freedoms through a process that 
stripped the Thirteenth Amendment of previous rights guarantees. 
The most natural reading of the Constitution after 1868 is that the 
Thirteenth Amendment frees slaves and the Fourteenth Amendment sets 
out the rights of newly freed slaves and persons who are or may be simi-
larly situated. If interpreters adopt even a fairly weak presumption that 
constitutional provisions are not redundant, the Democratic interpreta-
tion of the Thirteenth Amendment seems to best fit the contemporary 
Constitution as a whole. No language in Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment gives the reader any clue that the text is merely clarifying 
rights already protected by the Thirteenth Amendment. Republicans did 
not ratify a text that declared, for example, “The freedom granted by the 
Thirteenth Amendment entailed the following rights and privileges.” 
The Thirteenth Amendment, standing alone, by comparison seems more 
susceptible to the original Republican interpretation of the constitu-
tional ban on involuntary servitude. Without the Fourteenth 
Amendment, constitutional interpreters must derive the badges and in-
cidents of slavery or the fundamental freedoms of free persons from the 
                                                 
172. See 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) (finding state poll tax unconstitutional because 
“once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are incon-
sistent with the Equal Protection Clause”). 
173. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing Republican Party mem-
bers’ views on impact of Thirteenth Amendment). 
174. See supra text accompanying notes 113–114 (discussing Democrat party mem-
bers’ view of Thirteenth Amendment). 
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simple announcement that slavery will no longer exist in the United 
States.  
Constitutional debate immediately before and immediately after the 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment provides more evidence that 
the Thirteenth Amendment was largely stripped of substantive content 
when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. During the debates over 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, most Republicans insisted that the constitu-
tional ban on involuntary servitude entailed a robust set of fundamental 
freedoms.175 One of the most important of these freedoms was a right not 
to be the victim of discrimination. Senator Trumbull declared, “[A]ny 
statute which is not equal to all, and which deprives any citizen of civil 
rights which are secured to other citizens, is an unjust encroachment 
upon his liberty; and is, in fact, a badge of servitude which, by the 
Constitution, is prohibited.”176 After 1868, congressional debate focused 
almost entirely on the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Charles 
Sumner aside,177 the Republicans who favored the proposed ban on dis-
crimination in schools and places of public accommodations in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875 focused almost entirely on the congressional power 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Senator Matthew Carpenter of 
Wisconsin had “no doubt of the power of this Government under the 
fourteenth amendment . . . to say that a colored man shall have his right 
in the common school.”178 Representative William Lawrence, who in 
1866 had waxed eloquent on the broad scope of the Thirteenth 
Amendment,179 in 1875 limited his analysis to the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Forgetting his own Thirteenth Amendment defense of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, Lawrence informed Congress that all the civil 
rights acts the national legislature had passed “proceed upon the idea 
that if a State omits or neglects to secure the enforcement of equal rights, 
that it ‘denies’ the equal protection of the laws within the meaning of the 
fourteenth amendment.”180 The 102 pages that Michael McConnell de-
voted to the Civil Rights Act of 1875 in his monumental study of congres-
sional attitudes toward the constitutionality of segregation made an aver-
age of almost one citation per page to congressional references to the 
                                                 
175. See 1 Howard Gillman, Mark A. Graber & Keith E. Whittington, American 
Constitutionalism: Structures of Government 273–75 (2012) (quoting statements from 
Senators Trumbull and Sumner to illustrate Republican belief that Thirteenth Amend-
ment “guarantee[d] a robust set of rights”). 
176. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (statement of Sen. Lyman 
Trumbull). 
177. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 728 (1872) (statement of Sen. Charles 
Sumner) (arguing that Congress’s authority to pass Civil Rights Act of 1875 was “founded 
on the thirteenth amendment”). 
178. Id. at 763 (statement of Sen. Matthew Carpenter). 
179. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1832 (1866) (statement of Rep. William 
Lawrence). 
180. 2 Cong. Rec. 414 (1874) (statement of Rep. William Lawrence). 
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Fourteenth Amendment.181 The same pages contain only one reference 
to a congressional speech discussing the Thirteenth Amendment.182 
Federal court opinions suggest a similar tendency for judges to ex-
amine issues that had previously been thought to raise Thirteenth 
Amendment concerns under the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice 
Salmon Chase suggested the Thirteenth Amendment might protect a 
robust set of rights when riding circuit in In re Turner.183 That decision 
struck down a Maryland law requiring masters to teach only their white 
indentured servants to read on the ground that the law “does not contain 
important provisions for the security and benefit of the apprentice which 
are required by the laws of Maryland in indenture of white appren-
tices.”184 After the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, Justices focused 
their attention almost entirely on the Fourteenth Amendment when sim-
ilar rights claims were made. All three dissents in the Slaughter-House 
Cases, for example, focused their energy on the majority opinion’s nar-
row interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Swayne bluntly 
stated, “The first section of the fourteenth amendment is alone involved 
in the consideration of these cases.”185 Justice Field’s was the only dissent 
that raised the possibility that the majority’s interpretation of the 
Thirteenth Amendment might be too narrow.186 Strauder v. West Virginia, 
which declared that persons of color enjoyed a constitutional “right to 
exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as col-
ored,” was decided entirely under the Fourteenth Amendment.187 
Justice Harlan played the role of Charles Sumner when the Supreme 
Court, by an eight-to-one vote, in the Civil Rights Cases declared unconsti-
tutional the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Harlan alone insisted that the 
Thirteenth Amendment protected a robust set of rights, including the 
right not to be a victim of racial discrimination.188 His brethren accused 
                                                 
181. Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 Va. L. 
Rev. 947, 984–1086 (1995). 
182. Id. at 997 (referring to Senator Sumner’s comments, discussed supra at note 
177).  
183. 24 F. Cas. 337, 339 (Chase, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247) (“The 
first clause of the thirteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States interdicts 
slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, and establishes free-
dom as the constitutional right of all persons in the United States.”). 
184. Id.  
185. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 126 (1872) (Swayne, J., dissenting); see also id. at 93 
(Field, J., dissenting) (explaining “[t]he provisions of the fourteenth amendment, which is 
properly a supplement to the thirteenth, cover, in my judgment, the case before us”); id. 
at 122–24 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (analyzing Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Fourteenth Amendment).  
186. Id. at 89–91 (Field, J., dissenting) (arguing it is “clear that [the words ‘involun-
tary servitude’] include something more than slavery in the strict sense of the term”). 
187. 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879). 
188. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 35 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing 
when Congress passed Thirteenth Amendment it “undertook to remove certain burdens 
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those who thought that the Thirteenth Amendment protected a right 
against private discrimination of “running the slavery argument into the 
ground.”189 Justice Bradley’s majority opinion emphasized the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s declaration, “No State shall”—words that do 
not appear in the Thirteenth Amendment—when denying congressional 
power under the Fourteenth Amendment to ban what he claimed to be 
private race discrimination.190 
The career of Senator Lyman Trumbull, one of the most important 
framers of the post-Civil War Constitution, provides evidence that the 
diminished place of the Thirteenth Amendment in the American consti-
tutional universe weakened the rights protected by the Constitution as a 
whole. Shortly after the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified, Trumbull 
led the fight for the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Freedmen’s Bureau 
Act. His speeches, quoted above, insisted that the constitutional ban on 
slavery justified a broad array of individual freedoms.191 Shortly after the 
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, Trumbull began to oppose 
Reconstruction measures on constitutional grounds. Trumbull’s 
speeches discussed only the proper interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and he interpreted that Amendment as protecting a far 
narrower set of constitutional rights than he had claimed were protected 
by the Thirteenth Amendment in 1866. When arguing against the 
Enforcement Act of 1871, Trumbull asserted, 
[T]he Government of the United States was formed for national 
and general purposes, and not for the protection of the indi-
vidual in his personal rights of person and property. The rights 
of individuals were left, when the Constitution was formed, to 
the protection of the States. It was thought by the men who 
made the Government that personal liberty could be more 
safely left to the protection of the local authorities of the States 
than be conferred upon the General Government. . . . 
. . . The fourteenth amendment has not extended the rights 
and privileges of citizenship one iota.192 
When championing the Freedmen’s Bureau Act in 1866, Trumbull 
declared, “Those laws that . . . did not allow [the colored man] . . . to be 
educated, were all badges of servitude made in the interest of slavery.”193 
                                                                                                                 
and disabilities, the necessary incidents of slavery, and to secure all citizens of every race 
and color, and without regard to previous servitude, those fundamental rights which are 
the essence of civil freedom”). 
189. Id. at 24 (majority opinion). 
190. Id. at 10–11 (explaining “[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights is not the sub-
ject matter of the [Fourteenth] amendment”). 
191. See supra notes 99, 176 and accompanying text (recounting Senator Trumbull’s 
statements in various congressional debates). 
192. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 575–76 (1871) (statement of Sen. Lyman 
Trumbull). 
193. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1866) (statement of Sen. Lyman 
Trumbull). 
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When opposing the Civil Rights Act of 1875, Trumbull bluntly stated, 
“The right to go to school is not a civil right and never was.”194 Trumbull 
became far more conservative on racial matters during the later stages of 
Reconstruction.195 Nevertheless, given the crucial role he played in both 
passing legislation implementing the Thirteenth Amendment and fram-
ing the Fourteenth Amendment, his speeches before and after 1868 sup-
port claims that the Fourteenth Amendment changed the meaning of 
the Thirteenth Amendment. After 1868, Trumbull clearly regarded the 
Fourteenth Amendment as the main depository of fundamental rights 
and he interpreted those rights far less capaciously than he had previ-
ously interpreted the substantive rights protected by the Thirteenth 
Amendment.196 
The Thirteenth Amendment would have certainly enjoyed a far 
more exalted status had Republicans reacted differently to President 
Andrew Johnson’s veto of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, a veto that de-
clared that the Thirteenth Amendment did little more than free slaves.197 
In this constitutional universe, instead of ratifying the Fourteenth 
Amendment in order to provide clear foundations for early 
Reconstruction measures, Republicans stick to their guns on the mean-
ing of the Thirteenth Amendment and win. They repass both the 
Freedman’s Bureau Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 over Johnson’s 
opposition. Faced with impeachment, President Johnson backs down and 
agrees to accept the Republican interpretation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment. Future generations look to the speeches Republicans gave 
during the debates over the Freedman’s Bureau Act and the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 as the canonical assertions on the meaning of the Thirteenth 
Amendment. No one thinks the Thirteenth Amendment was passed 
solely for the purpose of providing constitutional support for the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866. In this world where the Thirteenth Amendment 
stands alone, the Constitution may protect more rights than the actual 
world in which the Thirteenth Amendment is paired with the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Both the constitutional text and the historical record suggest that 
Americans in 1868 transferred constitutional protections for fundamen-
tal freedoms from the Thirteenth Amendment to the Fourteenth 
Amendment. This transfer did not necessarily transform the fundamen-
                                                 
194. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3189 (1872) (statement of Sen. Lyman 
Trumbull). 
195. See Mark M. Krug, Lyman Trumbull: Conservative Radical 228–54 (1965) 
(charting Trumbull’s “gradual change from support for Johnson’s reconstruction scheme 
to serious doubts about its workability”); Horace White, The Life of Lyman Trumbull 296–
300 (1913) (describing Trumbull’s conservative votes during end of Reconstruction). 
196. See supra text accompanying note 192 (quoting Sen. Trumbull’s conception of 
Fourteenth Amendment).  
197. See Johnson, supra note 113 (presenting President Johnson’s construction of 
Thirteenth Amendment in his veto message).  
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tal freedoms protected by the Constitution as a whole. The past 150 years 
have demonstrated that anything that could be said under the 
Thirteenth Amendment can and has been said under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Nevertheless, something may be lost in translation. Taylor 
Strauder’s claim to be tried by a jury in which persons of color were not 
excluded by law proved easier to state using the language of the 
Fourteenth Amendment than the language of the Thirteenth 
Amendment.198 The petitioners in the Civil Rights Cases learned that their 
claimed right against race discrimination in places of public accommoda-
tion was far more difficult to state using the language of the Fourteenth 
Amendment than the language of the Thirteenth Amendment.199 Their 
experience, and that of numerous other Americans with claims of fun-
damental freedoms, highlights how ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment left neither the Thirteenth Amendment nor the 
Constitution as a whole unchanged. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
REVIVAL 
Political scientists and historians are frequently frustrated by what 
law professors write, and vice versa. Political scientists and historians reg-
ularly accuse law professors of engaging in law office history, writing nar-
ratives that are more designed to persuade judges about present truths 
than to provide accurate information about the American past. Martin 
Flaherty notes how “constitutional discourse is replete with historical as-
sertions that are at best deeply problematic and at worst, howlers.”200 Law 
professors respond by accusing political scientists and historians of, at 
best, irrelevance or, at worst, justifying injustice when the latter spin nar-
ratives that focus on the least attractive side of the American constitu-
tional heritage. When Gregory Magarian criticizes Transforming Free Speech 
by asserting, “Graber never fully develops the connection he appears to 
want to draw between the conservative libertarian tradition and his own 
quite egalitarian vision of expression rights,”201 he assumes the only point 
of “useable” history is to provide historical foundations for contemporary 
policy positions.202 Justice Black could not understand how Leonard 
Levy, who believed that “the concept of seditious libel and freedom of 
                                                 
198. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310–12 (1879) (holding for 
Strauder on Fourteenth Amendment grounds). 
199. See supra notes 188–190 and accompanying text (discussing Court’s considera-
tion of Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments in Civil Rights Cases).  
200. Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 
Colum. L. Rev. 523, 525 (1995). 
201. Gregory P. Magarian, Book Review, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1425, 1428 (1992). 
202. See generally, Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable Past, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 
601, 603 (1995) (explaining useable past “points to the goal of finding elements in history 
that can be brought fruitfully to bear on current problems”). 
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the press are incompatible,”203 could nevertheless publish a book in 
which he claimed that the persons responsible for the First Amendment 
did not intend to prohibit the criminalization of seditious libel.204 Black 
declared that Legacy of Suppression “is probably one of the most devastat-
ing blows that has been delivered against civil liberty in America for a 
long time.”205 
This Essay may frustrate contemporary progressives in much the 
same way that Leonard Levy frustrated Hugo Black. Very good constitu-
tional and political reasons justify constitutional decisions adopting vir-
tually all the proposals made by the authors in this Symposium. The only 
reservation a progressive might have with judicial decisions promoting 
progressive conceptions of gender equality206 or labor rights207 is a mild 
Rosenbergian concern with judicial efficacy and backlash,208 not a 
Bickelian concern with the countermajoritarian difficulty.209 Indeed, in 
sharp contrast to Levy, who thought the Framers of the First Amendment 
had an unduly crabbed theory of free speech, good reasons exist for 
thinking the framers of the Thirteenth Amendment provided the foun-
dations for quite progressive notions of racial equality and fundamental 
freedoms.210 Each of the progressive lawyers in this Symposium has advo-
cated a perfectly plausible interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
If, therefore, the policy is just and the history is plausible, surely the de-
sire to publish a paper in the Columbia Law Review is hardly a sufficient 
motive to question the constitutional foundations for a more progressive 
Thirteenth Amendment. 
This Essay quarrels with the constitutional politics of the Thirteenth 
Amendment revival, not with more progressive interpretations of that 
text. Americans during Reconstruction were well aware of the liberating 
potential of the constitutional ban on slavery. Many Republicans made 
such arguments during the debates over the framing of the Thirteenth 
                                                 
203. Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, at xvii (1985) [hereinafter Levy, 
Emergence]. 
204. See Levy, Legacy, supra note 155, at 236–37 (1960) (discussing Framers’ intent 
with respect to First Amendment and seditious libel). 
205. Levy, Emergence, supra note 203, at xviii. 
206. E.g., Alexander Tsesis, Gender Subordination, supra note 14.  
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208. See Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social 
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209. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at 
the Bar of Politics 16–17 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing concept of countermajoritarian diffi-
culty). 
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equality and fundamental freedoms.  
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Amendment,211 the Civil Rights Act of 1866,212 and the Freedman’s 
Bureau Act of 1866.213 Such arguments largely disappeared from both 
Congress and the Supreme Court Reports after the Fourteenth Amendment 
was ratified, and were replaced by somewhat narrower constructions of 
the privileges and immunities of American citizens, equal protection, 
and due process.214 Theories of constitutional interpretation do not fully 
explain why such Republicans as Lyman Trumbull abandoned progres-
sive interpretations of the Thirteenth Amendment as early as the late 
1860s. Politics also mattered. 
Political histories of Reconstruction tell a very different narrative 
than the conventional legal lore about trends in American support for 
racial equality and fundamental freedoms. The standard constitutional 
narratives, discussed above, tell of ever-increasing commitment to fun-
damental rights and the rights of former slaves or of a consistent com-
mitment to those freedoms and rights from the framing of the 
Thirteenth Amendment to the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment. 
Such scholars as Michael Les Benedict, Eric Foner, and Philip Klinkner 
and Rogers Smith, by comparison, detail a steady decline during this 
same time period in public support for providing robust constitutional 
protections to former slaves.215 American support for racial equality, their 
histories suggest, peaked during the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 and the Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1866.216 In 1865 and the first 
                                                 
211. See Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1437–40 (1864) (statement of Sen. James 
Harlan) (explaining Thirteenth Amendment could cover suppression of freedom of 
speech, education, and other things); id. at 1479–83 (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner) 
(explaining Thirteenth Amendment would expand liberty for all people). 
212. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (statement of Sen. Lyman 
Trumbull) (“I take it that any statute which is not equal to all, and which deprives any 
citizens of civil rights which are secured to other citizens, is an unjust encroachment upon 
his liberty; and is, in fact, a badge of servitude which, by the Constitution, is prohibited.”); 
id. at 684 (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner) (arguing abolition of Black Code appropri-
ate to enforce abolition of slavery). 
213. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1866) (statement of Sen. Lyman 
Trumbull) (explaining “[t]he [Thirteenth] amendment abolishes just as absolutely all 
provisions of State or local law which make a man a slave as it takes away the power of his 
former master to control him”). 
214. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text (discussing narrowing of rights 
previously secured under Thirteenth Amendment after ratification of Fourteenth 
Amendment).  
215. See Benedict, supra note 4, at 272–74 (describing public dissatisfaction with “un-
qualified suffrage” and Republican response); Foner, supra note 2, at 525 (noting “the 
erosion of the free labor ideology [that accompanied the Depression] made possible a 
resurgence of overt racism that undermined support for Reconstruction”); Philip A. 
Klinkner & Rogers M. Smith, The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial 
Equality in America 74 (1999) (explaining “[t]o preserve long-familiar privileges in a 
changing world, to oppose what were perceived as excessive transformational goals of the 
racial ‘radicals,’ many white Americans underwent the ‘great change’”).  
216. See Klinkner & Smith, supra note 215, at 85 (noting, by 1874, common senti-
ment was that “the negro [had] got as much as he ought to have”).  
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months of 1866, a united Republican Party first ratified the Thirteenth 
Amendment and then asserted that the congressional power to enforce 
the constitutional ban on slavery justified national legislation providing 
African Americans and others with a wide array of substantive free-
doms.217 Republican solidarity weakened in mid-1866 during the debates 
over framing the Fourteenth Amendment.218 Conservative Republicans 
consistently rejected proposals by such Radicals as Thaddeus Stevens and 
Charles Sumner that provided powerful guarantees of economic and po-
litical equality to African Americans.219 The American commitment to 
racial equality further weakened during the time period when states were 
ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment.220 Some states tried, unsuccess-
fully, to rescind their ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment after the 
elections of 1867 dramatically increased the power of Northern 
Democrats in state legislatures. Several prominent Republicans inter-
preted the election returns as mandating a retreat from their party’s pre-
vious support for civil rights.221 The Grant Administration and Congress 
during the 1870s provided support for persons of color only in short 
bursts.222 Republicans passed laws empowering the president to protect 
the rights of freed slaves but rarely provided the government with the 
funds necessary to enforce those laws.223 The Grant Administration 
repeatedly wavered in its commitment to implementing federal law in 
the South.224 In 1874, Republicans lost their majority in the House of 
Representatives.225 In 1876, Republicans retained the White House only 
by agreeing to remove federal troops from the South.226 
                                                 
217. See Foner, supra note 2, at 66–76 (discussing passage of Thirteenth Amendment 
and debates about appropriate legislation under Amendment).  
218. See id. at 251–61 (discussing Fourteenth Amendment debates and impact of up-
coming elections on Republican support).  
219. See id. at 240 (noting proposals like those of Sumner’s “to overturn the Johnson 
governments and commit Congress to black suffrage fell on deaf ears”).  
220. See id. at 268–69 (noting “white public opinion . . . was very unanimous against 
adopting the Amendment”); see also Klinkner & Smith, supra note 215, at 79–80 (noting 
during ratification campaign for Fourteenth Amendment “[m]ore conservative 
Republicans feared . . . that the party was going too far”).  
221. See Benedict, supra note 4, at 272–74 (describing key Republican defeats in 
elections of 1867 and noting senators at time blamed the “suffrage question”). 
222. See Foner, supra note 2, at 446 (describing passage of Fifteenth Amendment); 
see also Klinkner & Smith, supra note 215, at 80–83 (providing overview of Congress dur-
ing Grant’s presidency).  
223. See Klinkner & Smith, supra note 215, at 81 (noting Republicans’ “enforcement 
acts . . . were far weaker than they appeared” and citing lack of money as reason).  
224. See Foner, supra note 2, at 458 (noting Grant’s implementation of enforcement 
acts to arrest those committing racially motivated violence represented “dramatic depar-
ture” and administration had previously “launched few initiatives in Southern policy”). 
225. See id. at 549–50 (explaining “[t]he 1874 Southern elections proved as disas-
trous for Republicans as those in the North”).  
226. See Klinkner & Smith, supra note 215, at 89 (describing withdrawal of troops 
from South).  
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The constitutional story told in Part II is consistent with this political 
history. The Republicans who framed and ratified the Fourteenth 
Amendment protected fewer rights than the Republicans who framed 
and ratified the Thirteenth Amendment, because Republicans by the 
time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified were less committed to ra-
cial equality and national protection for fundamental freedoms than they 
were when the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified.227 The Republicans 
in 1870 and afterwards who discussed the constitutional rights of persons 
of color preferred the Fourteenth Amendment to the Thirteenth 
Amendment because the former better reflected their increasing racial 
conservatism. Justice John Harlan’s dissents demonstrate that late-
nineteenth-century Americans had the interpretive tools necessary to use 
the Thirteenth Amendment and other constitutional provisions to pro-
tect a wide array of rights.228 What they lacked was the political will or, in 
the case of the decreasing number of committed racial egalitarians, the 
political power.229 
During the third quarter of the twentieth century, Americans tem-
porarily regained the political will and, as a result, an increased number 
of racial egalitarians gained the political power necessary to provide 
greater protections for progressive conceptions of racial equality and 
fundamental freedoms. The Warren Court declared that separate but 
equal had no place in American constitutionalism230 and that racial 
distinctions as well as racial discriminations had to satisfy a demanding 
strict scrutiny test.231 Vinson and Warren Court majorities consistently 
found state action in circumstances where nineteenth-century justices 
                                                 
227. See supra notes 215–219 and accompanying text (discussing decline in 
Republican solidarity on civil rights issues after 1866). 
228. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, “if enforced according to their true 
intent and meaning, will protect all the civil rights that pertain to freedom and citizen-
ship”); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (expressing 
disappointment that “the court has departed from the familiar rule requiring, in the in-
terpretation of constitutional provisions, that full effect be given to the intent with which 
they were adopted”). 
229. See supra notes 215–226 and accompanying text (discussing erosion of 
Republican commitment to, and power to achieve, civil rights aims after 1866).  
230. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (concluding “in the field of 
public education, the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place”). 
231. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) (explaining “[t]he clear and cen-
tral purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of 
invidious racial discrimination” in holding unconstitutional state scheme to prevent mar-
riages between people based on race); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) 
(holding same and explaining “courts must reach and determine the question whether 
the classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose—in this case, 
whether there is an arbitrary or invidious discrimination between those classes covered by 
[the] cohabitation law and those excluded”). 
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saw only private racial discrimination.232 Congress, when passing the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, relied on the 
Commerce Clause of Article I, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the 
Fifteenth Amendment to expand dramatically protections to persons of 
color and other fundamental rights.233 The Supreme Court used the Due 
Process Clause to incorporate almost all the provisions in the Bill of 
Rights234 and to protect other fundamental rights that were not explicitly 
enumerated in those provisions.235 Several Supreme Court opinions held 
that the Equal Protection Clause required that gender and other nonra-
cial discriminations satisfy a heightened standard of judicial scrutiny.236 
Both constitutional law and politics contributed to the process that 
brought the rights revolution of the 1960s to a halt. Elizabeth Bussiere 
details how the text of the Fourteenth Amendment and inherited judicial 
doctrine handicapped litigation movements aimed at having the 
Supreme Court declare that the Constitution protected certain positive 
rights.237 The state action doctrine helps explain why some justices who 
in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States238 enthusiastically supported 
congressional power to ban private discrimination under the Commerce 
Clause recoiled in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis239 from exercising judicial 
power under the Fourteenth Amendment to bar private discrimination. 
Perhaps a rights revolution based on the Thirteenth Amendment would 
                                                 
232. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961) 
(concluding “fact that the restaurant is operated as an integral part of a public building 
devoted to a public parking service, indicates that degree of state participation and in-
volvement in discriminatory action” prohibited by Fourteenth Amendment); Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948) (finding judicial enforcement of racial covenants to be 
state action under Fourteenth Amendment).  
233. See S. Rep. No. 89-162, at 32 (1965) (“[T]he Congress of the United States has 
made a clear mandate under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments to the 
Constitution to enforce these provisions . . . .”); S. Rep. No. 88-872, at 12–14 (1964) (ne-
glecting to discuss Fourteenth Amendment because “the instant measure is based on the 
commerce clause”).  
234. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (holding “the 
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which . . . 
would come within the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee”).  
235. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (invalidating state criminal abortion stat-
ute as violative of Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding right of privacy in “penumbras” of Bill of 
Rights). 
236. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977) (arguing, while strict scrutiny 
did not apply, “the scrutiny ‘is not a toothless one’” (quoting Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 
495, 509 (1976))); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that “classifications 
by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related 
to achievement of those objectives”). 
237. Elizabeth Bussiere, Disentitling the Poor: The Warren Court, Welfare Rights, 
and the American Political Tradition 6 (1997). 
238. 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
239. 407 U.S. 163, 164 (1972). The majority opinion in Moose Lodge included Justices 
Stewart and White, who were also a part of the majority in Heart of Atlanta Motel. 
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have progressed further than a rights revolution based on the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Nevertheless, for every constitutional claim Thirteenth 
Amendment revivalists make, there is a perfectly respectable law review 
article or judicial opinion claiming that some provision of the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects the same right or gives Congress the 
power to protect the same right. Frank Michelman in a series of articles 
published in the late 1960s and early 1970s made a powerful argument 
for interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment as guaranteeing all persons 
rights to basic necessities.240 Justice Douglas in Heart of Atlanta Motel 
would have largely scuttled the state action doctrine.241 Justice Brennan’s 
dissent in Moose Lodge provided reasons for thinking the state action re-
quirement does not serve to substantially inhibit judicial power under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to bar private racial discrimination.242 The 
rights revolution stalled in the 1970s in large part for the same reasons 
the rights revolution stalled in the late 1860s.243 As Americans lost the will 
to provide greater protections for racial equality and fundamental free-
doms, the declining number of advocates for more robust racial equality 
and fundamental freedoms lost the political power necessary to make 
their constitutional vision the official constitutional law of the land. 
Richard Nixon, Nixon’s judicial appointments, and the political coali-
tions that brought Nixon to and maintained him in power had at least as 
much to do with constitutional decisions in the 1970s that limited posi-
tive rights244 and racial integration245 as any inherent weaknesses in the 
                                                 
240. See Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7, 9 (1969) (arguing Court’s “‘egalitarian’ inter-
ventions . . . could be . . . understood as vindication of a state’s duty to protect against cer-
tain hazards which are endemic in an unequal society” (emphasis omitted)); Frank I. 
Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls’ Theory of 
Justice, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 962, 966 (1973) (examining support in Rawlsian theory for 
“specific welfare guaranties in a constitution or determinations by the judiciary that some 
such guaranties are already present in the spacious locutions of, say, section one of the 
fourteenth amendment”). 
241. 379 U.S. at 241 (Douglas, J., concurring) (explaining under his construction of 
Fourteenth Amendment, right to be free of discrimination in public accommodations and 
that state enforcement of trespass laws would be state action). 
242. See 407 U.S. at 190 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining “the mere existence of 
efforts by the State, through legislation or otherwise, to authorize, encourage, or otherwise 
support racial discrimination in a particular facet of life constitutes illegal state involve-
ment” (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 202 (1970))). 
243. See Klinkner & Smith, supra note 215, at 294–95 (comparing shift in sentiments 
between 1865 and 1908 to “the pattern [of] what ha[d] happened in the United States 
after each of the other two periods of major racial reforms, the Revolutionary era and the 
modern World War II–Cold War decades”).  
244. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) 
(finding education is not fundamental right); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483 
(1970) (holding welfare assistance is not fundamental right). 
245. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 751 (1974) (finding multidistrict 
remedy for de jure school segregation inappropriate). 
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Fourteenth Amendment as a source for a progressive constitutional vi-
sion.246 
CONCLUSION 
Contemporary American politics places greater obstacles in the path 
of a revived Thirteenth Amendment than contemporary constitutional 
law. The constitutional law is available. This Symposium highlights the 
plausible Thirteenth Amendment grounds on which constitutional deci-
sionmakers might justify progressive conceptions of racial equality and 
fundamental freedoms. As the above paragraph suggests, the law reviews 
and judicial dissents provide plausible Fourteenth Amendment grounds 
for reaching similar, if not identical, progressive constitutional decisions. 
All that is missing is the political will necessary to staff crucial govern-
ment institutions with constitutional decisionmakers interested in relying 
on those strands of American constitutionalism that support a more ro-
bust conception of racial equality and more progressive notions of politi-
cal freedom. The United States at present seems to be in a long period of 
racial stagnation, in which opponents of racial hierarchies must spend far 
more energy preserving past gains that advanced toward a more egalitar-
ian society. As Philip Klinkner and Rogers Smith noted in 1999, “the 
forces that pressed for racial equality so powerfully for so long in modern 
America have again receded.”247 The next decade did not bring about 
any renaissance.248 
Whether Thirteenth Amendment revivalism has the potential to end 
that stagnation is doubtful. Political movements do not hang on textual 
clauses. Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King rallied their support-
ers by invoking the broad principles in the Declaration of Independence. 
Lincoln in his debates with Douglas spoke of a general constitutional 
commitment to place slavery on “the course of ultimate extinction”249 
and in the Gettysburg Address promised “a new birth of freedom” to a 
nation “dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.”250 
Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” speech reminded Americans of 
                                                 
246. See generally Kevin J. McMahon, Nixon’s Court: His Challenge to Judicial 
Liberalism and Its Political Consequences 8 (2011) (arguing “the Nixon-shaped Burger 
Court largely adopted the general approach—if not the specific positions—[Nixon’s] ad-
ministration advanced on law and order and school desegregation”). 
247. Klinkner & Smith, supra note 215, at 5.  
248. See generally Desmond S. King & Rogers M. Smith, Still a House Divided: Race 
and Politics in Obama’s America 13 (2011) (arguing “[i]n the early twenty-first century, 
the stark reality is that the United States remains a house divided, on race and by race”). 
249. Abraham Lincoln, Mr. Lincoln’s Reply: First Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at 
Ottawa, Illinois (Aug. 21, 1858), in 3 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, supra 
note 129, at 1, 18.  
250. Abraham Lincoln, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at 
Gettysburg: Final Text, in 7 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, supra note 129, at 
23, 23. 
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the “promise that all men, yes, black men as well as white men, would be 
guaranteed the unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of hap-
piness,” and asked Americans to “live out the true meaning of its creed—
‘we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal.’”251 Neither Lincoln nor King in public or in private expressed any 
interest in whether one constitutional provision provided a better hook 
than another for movement goals.  
Political consultants are far better able than constitutional lawyers to 
determine precisely what appeals might mobilize a revitalized progressive 
coalition. Although Thirteenth Amendment revivalism is unlikely to mo-
bilize such a coalition, such a perspective on American constitutionalism 
might prove quite useful once that progressive coalition is empowered, 
even if equally plausible Fourteenth Amendment arguments exist for 
progressive conceptions of racial equality and fundamental freedoms. 
Sympathetic constitutional decisionmakers often prefer “jumping the 
tracks” to overruling past decisions. They declare past rulings rejecting 
claims that one constitutional provision protected some right left open 
the possibility that some other constitutional provision protected that 
right. Gordon Silverstein discussed this practice at some length when he 
asked readers “to imagine two parallel sets of train tracks, each represent-
ing a pre-existing set of lineal precedents. A lateral move might occur 
when a judge jumps from one track to another.”252 Rather than abandon 
the precedents establishing the state action requirement of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the constitutional decisionmakers responsible 
for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 relied heavily on the Commerce Clause as 
the vehicle for justifying congressional power to regulate private eco-
nomic discrimination.253 Rather than overrule the Slaughter-House Cases, 
the Supreme Court for more than 100 years used the Due Process Clause 
as the vehicle for incorporating various provisions of the Bill of Rights 
and protecting fundamental freedoms.254 The Essays in this Symposium 
and others interpreted the constitutional ban on slavery to provide foun-
                                                 
251. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Speech Delivered at the Lincoln 
Memorial (Aug. 28, 1963), in I Have a Dream: Writings and Speeches that Changed the 
World 102, 104 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1992) (quoting The Declaration of 
Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776)).  
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Politics 68 (2009). 
253. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (find-
ing “ample power” for Congress to pass Title II under Commerce Clause and therefore 
“not consider[ing] the other grounds relied upon”). 
254. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3030–31 (2010) (“For many 
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Clause claims). 
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dations for Supreme Court opinions that might similarly promote pro-
gressive causes by “jumping the tracks.” Justices favoring greater protec-
tion for gender rights or rights to basic necessities might accelerate the 
process necessary for realizing those goods by citing Professor Tsesis, 
Dean Soifer, and the other distinguished Thirteenth Amendment revival-
ists when writing future opinions that may assert “past cases limiting 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment left open whether the 
Thirteenth Amendment might provide more robust protection.” 
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